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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court launched a criminal-procedure
revolution. 1 With its decision in Crawford v. Washington, the Court

* Elizabeth Stevens is currently an associate attorney at Parravano Witten PC in Monterey,
California. I am grateful to Professor Ruth Hargrove of California Western School of Law and
Richard Katskee of the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights, both of whom read
drafts of this Article prior to submission, for their insightful comments and advice. I also wish to
thank the staff of the Akron Journal of Constitutional Law and Policy for their tireless efforts in
shaping the Article for publication.
1. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 475
F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 2007) (Crawford “fundamentally altered the role of the Confrontation
Clause”); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 671 (6th Cir. 2004) (Crawford “introduced a
fundamental reconception of the Confrontation Clause”); Thomas F. Burke III, The Test Results
Said What? The Post-Crawford Admissibility of Hearsay Forensic Evidence, 53 S.D. L. REV. 1, 1
(2008) (Crawford “dramatically upset th[e] evidentiary landscape”); Richard D. Friedman,
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radically reinterpreted the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,
which secures a criminal defendant’s right “to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” 2 Before, when a prosecution witness was
unavailable for cross-examination by the accused at trial, the witness’s
out-of-court statements could still be admitted for their truth if the trial
judge found them sufficiently reliable. 3 After Crawford, if such hearsay
statements are comparable to in-court testimony, or “testimonial,” they
are admissible only if the accused had a prior opportunity to crossFive years later, in Melendez-Diaz v.
examine the witness. 4
Massachusetts, the Court applied this rule to forensic evidence, holding
that certificates of analysis—used in a drug trial to prove the nature and
weight of the proscribed substances, and sworn to and signed by the
analysts who performed the tests—are testimonial. 5 This decision
heralds dramatic change for the Confrontation Clause and for criminal
trials.
The facts of the case were prosaic. Boston police arrested Luis
Melendez-Diaz in a Kmart parking lot after a store employee whom
Melendez-Diaz and a companion had picked up in a car dropped four
plastic bags of white powder as he stepped out. 6 En route to the police
station, the officers noticed Melendez-Diaz, his companion, and the
hapless Kmart employee “fidgeting and making furtive movements” in

Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 553, 554 (2007) (Crawford “changed the
landscape dramatically”).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (“[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’
Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”).
4. 541 U.S. at 68. In interpreting the Confrontation Clause, both Roberts and Crawford refer
to “hearsay” and “unavailability,” terms defined in most evidence codes. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.
801 (defining “hearsay” and associated terms); FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (defining “unavailable”).
Roberts aligned the constitutional standard for admission of hearsay with the evidentiary one. See
448 U.S. at 66 (holding that admission of hearsay statements does not offend the Confrontation
Clause if the statements fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception”); FED R. EVID. 802 (making
hearsay generally inadmissible); FED. R. EVID. 803 (listing exceptions to Rule 802); FED. R. EVID.
804 (also listing exceptions to Rule 802). Crawford makes clear that the Confrontation Clause is
concerned with only a subset of hearsay statements, and that the Rules of Evidence do not delineate
which statements fall within this sphere. See 541 U.S. at 53-54, 56 (explaining that the Clause
proscribes admission of “testimonial” hearsay absent declarant unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination, regardless of whether or not a hearsay exception applies).
5. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
6. Id. at 2530.

STEVENS_CONLAW_2010-2011.DOC

2011]

6/2/2011 1:50 PM

CRAWFORD’S LAST STAND?

83

the back seat of the police cruiser.7 The officers subsequently
discovered nineteen additional bags, apparently containing the same
substance as the first four, “hidden in the partition between the front and
back seats.” 8 They sent the bags to a state laboratory, where analysts
tested the bags’ contents and found cocaine. 9
At Melendez-Diaz’s trial for cocaine distribution and trafficking,
the analysts did not appear. Instead, the prosecution offered the seized
bags into evidence along with three “certificates of analysis.” 10 The
certificates, to which the analysts at the laboratory swore before a notary
public, recited the weight and contents (cocaine) of the substances in the
bags. 11 Melendez-Diaz objected that the Confrontation Clause entitled
him to cross-examine the certificates’ authors, but the trial court
nonetheless admitted the certificates “pursuant to state law as ‘prima
facie evidence of the composition, quality, and . . . net weight of the
narcotic analyzed.’” 12 The jury found Melendez-Diaz guilty, and
because the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had held that
certificates of forensic analysis were non-testimonial—such that under
Crawford, defendants had no right to cross-examine their authors—the
state appellate courts affirmed his conviction.13
In the U.S. Supreme Court, the case triggered a three-way doctrinal
split among the Justices. For the five-member majority, the conclusion
that the certificates were testimonial followed logically from Crawford:
as affidavits, they were functionally equivalent to in-court testimony. 14
Hence, they were inadmissible absent either in-court testimony by their
authors or a showing by the prosecution of unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination. 15 Although Justice Thomas joined
the majority, he wrote separately to emphasize his continued adherence
to an independent interpretation of the Confrontation Clause—in effect,
Crawford-plus—under which a statement must also be solemn, or
“formalized,” to trigger the confrontation right. 16 In dissent, four
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2530-31.
10. Id. at 2531.
11. Id.
12. Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13 (2008)).
13. Id. (noting that Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005) held that “the
authors of certificates of forensic analysis are not subject to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment”). Before Melendez-Diaz, state and lower federal courts had split as to whether
forensic reports were testimonial under Crawford. See infra note 77.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Justices attacked the majority’s conclusion on doctrinal and policy
grounds. Alleging that the Court had misread both the Confrontation
Clause and Crawford, they advanced a competing interpretation of the
constitutional text. 17 Melendez-Diaz thus leaves the basic Crawford rule
without majority support. Accordingly, it represents a turning point in
the Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and the beginning of a
retreat from Crawford.
Concerns about Crawford’s real-world impact appear to have
sparked this rupture. The certificates in Melendez-Diaz recited the
results of routine controlled substance analyses, but the opinion’s logic
sweeps broadly, embracing other forms of forensic evidence. 18 Given
both the frequency with which prosecutors offer forensic analyses
through documents or the testimony of surrogate experts,19 and the
obvious logistical obstacles to making forensic analysts regularly
available for live testimony, Melendez-Diaz could fundamentally alter
how prosecutors build and present criminal cases. The decision will
undoubtedly impose significant practical costs, but its corresponding
benefit—an increase in verdict reliability in cases involving forensic
evidence—counterbalances those costs.
This article will analyze Melendez-Diaz’s implications for the
Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and for the criminal justice
system. In Part II, I focus on doctrine, analyzing the decision and
exploring what the dueling opinions tell us about the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause and the future of Crawford. In Part III, I turn to
the decision’s real-world impact, outlining its costs and benefits as
predicted by the majority and dissent, and explaining why neither
opinion gets its cost-benefit analysis quite right.
II. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS
Melendez-Diaz exposed sharp divisions among the Justices over
Confrontation Clause doctrine. The majority characterized its decision

17. See id. at 2551-52 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (contending that the Clause applies only to
statements of witnesses who have perceived events giving them “personal knowledge of some
aspect of the defendant’s guilt”).
18. See id. at 2536-38 (majority opinion) (discussing utility of confrontation in assessing
reliability of forensic evidence generally and mentioning several other forensic disciplines).
19. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After Crawford
v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791, 797, 805 (2007) (noting that “expert evidence is sometimes
introduced without any live testimony at all,” and that “[o]n many occasions, the forensic expert
who testifies in court is not the person who actually conducted the forensic tests in the case”).
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as “a straightforward application of . . . Crawford,” 20 but the four
Moreover, Justice Thomas
dissenters emphatically disagreed.21
concurred separately to explain that he had joined the majority only
because its holding accorded with his own, distinct view of the
Confrontation Clause. 22 In this Part, I first outline the majority’s
reasoning and the dissent’s proposed alternative. I then examine their
dispute concerning the Framers’ intent and Crawford’s holding, as well
as the significance of Justice Thomas’s concurrence. Finally, I
synthesize the Court’s recent Confrontation Clause decisions to
determine what Melendez-Diaz signals about the future of Crawford.
A.

Dueling Definitions

For the majority, Melendez-Diaz was an easy case, and Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the Court reads like a mathematical proof:
(1) The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right
“‘to be confronted with the witnesses against [them].’” 23
(2) Crawford construed the term “witnesses” to mean those “who
‘bear testimony’” against a defendant.24 Thus, the Clause forbids the
admission of testimony—or “testimonial” statements—against a
defendant unless the witness “appears at trial, or if the witness is
unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination.” 25
(3) Crawford offered three possible definitions for “testimonial”
statements: (i) “‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations,
prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be
used prosecutorially;” (ii) “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions;’” and (iii) “‘statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’”26

20. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2533.
21. See id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and
Alito joined Justice Kennedy’s dissent. Id.
22. See id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
23. See id. at 2531 (majority opinion) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004)) (omissions in original).
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(4) The certificates at issue in Melendez-Diaz, having been sworn to
before a notary public, “[we]re quite plainly affidavits,” placing them
squarely within formulations (i) and (ii). 27 They also fit within
formulation (iii), for “under Massachusetts law the[ir] sole purpose . . .
was to provide ‘prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the
net weight of the analyzed substance.’” 28
(5) Accordingly, the certificates were testimonial statements, and
their analyst authors were “‘witnesses for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment.’” 29 Absent a showing by the prosecution of unavailability
and a prior opportunity for cross-examination, Melendez-Diaz was
entitled to confront them at trial.30
For the dissent, the Court’s error begins at Step (2). In the
dissenters’ view, the term “witness” in the Confrontation Clause
embraces only “conventional” witnesses—those who perceive events
giving them “personal knowledge of some aspect of the defendant’s
guilt.” 31 But unlike a conventional witness, a technician or analyst
“observes neither the crime nor any human action related to it.”32
Whereas a conventional witness recalls past events, an analyst’s report
consists of “near-contemporaneous observations.” 33 And while analysts
conduct “laboratory tests . . . according to scientific protocols,” a
conventional witness “responds to questions under interrogation.” 34
This dichotomy is not without flaws. Limiting confrontation to
those witnesses with first-hand knowledge of the crime would yield
27. See id. at 2532.
28. Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent assumes that thus defined, this class
excludes forensic analysts. But the chemists who analyzed the seized substances in Melendez-Diaz
presumably perceived their own execution of the tests as well as those tests’ results, and on
perceiving those results, they acquired personal knowledge that the substances contained cocaine—
a fact material to Melendez-Diaz’s guilt of trafficking cocaine.
32. Id. at 2552.
33. Id. at 2551. The Court’s holding in Davis v. Washington does incorporate this
consideration, see id., but does not turn on it. Davis held that statements made under police
interrogation are non-testimonial when circumstances objectively indicate that the interrogation’s
primary purpose is to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency, and testimonial when
circumstances indicate that the interrogation’s primary purpose is to prove past facts potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). The
distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial statements thus depends on the statements’
primary purpose, not on their timing. See id. at 826-28. Whether a statement narrates ongoing
events or reports completed acts is simply one factor that may “objectively indicate [that] its
primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” or alternatively,
that its primary purpose was to report or provide evidence of a crime. Id. at 828.
34. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2552 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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absurd results, allowing unconfronted admission of police reports and
Further, if near-contemporaneous
exempting expert witnesses. 35
observations were exempt from confrontation, then victims’ crime-scene
affidavits and accusations to interrogating officers would be nontestimonial, and Hammon v. Indiana, decided in 2006 by an eightmember majority, would have come out the other way. 36 As for the
suggestion that the Confrontation Clause reaches only responses to
interrogation, “‘[t]he Framers were no more willing to exempt from
cross-examination volunteered testimony . . . than they were to exempt
answers to detailed questions.’” 37
Nevertheless, two arguments the dissent marshals for its competing
constitutional theory merit further examination because they illuminate
the depth of the Court’s internal dispute—and the direction in which its
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence may be headed. First, the dissent
turns to the historical record, arguing that the Framers intended the
Clause to apply only to “conventional” witnesses. Second, it contends
that the majority has misconstrued the Court’s holding in Crawford, and
that Crawford in fact agrees with its own reading of the Confrontation
Clause. The next two sections analyze the majority and dissenting
opinions’ arguments and counter-arguments on these two points. 38
35. Id. at 2535 (majority opinion).
36. See id. Hammon was consolidated with Davis, as both cases involved Crawford’s
application to statements made in the course of police interrogation. In Hammon, police responded
to a reported domestic dispute at the Hammons’ home, and when Amy Hammon invited them to
enter, they saw evidence of a very recent physical altercation. Davis, 547 U.S. at 819. Once they
had separated the couple for questioning, Amy accused her husband of battery, and at the
interviewing officer’s request, she signed an affidavit. Id. at 819-20. Amy’s accusation and her
affidavit were made sufficiently close in time to the events she described that in her husband’s
subsequent battery trial, the court admitted her statements to the officer under the hearsay exception
for excited utterances, and her affidavit under the hearsay exception for present sense impressions.
See id. at 820; IND. R. EVID. 803(1) (defining “present sense impression” as “[a] statement
describing or explaining a material event, condition, or transaction, made while the declarant was
perceiving the event, condition, or transaction, or immediately thereafter”); IND. R. EVID. 803(2)
(defining “excited utterance” as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition”). Nonetheless,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that Amy’s statements and affidavit “could not be admitted absent an
opportunity to confront the witness.” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2535. Even setting aside this
conflict with precedent, the dissent’s distinction between “near-contemporaneous observations” and
recollection of past events would not change the outcome in Melendez-Diaz. The certificates of
analysis challenged there, having been “completed almost a week after the tests were performed,”
could hardly be characterized as setting forth “near-contemporaneous observations.” Id.
37. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822-23 n.1) (alteration in
original). In any event, the certificates in Melendez-Diaz were produced at police request. Id.
38. The dissent also offers a third argument: that by “expand[ing] the Clause to include
laboratory analysts,” id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), the Court had “swe[pt] away an accepted
rule governing the admission of scientific evidence” that “ha[d] been established for at least 90
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History Lessons

The dissent claims that when drafting the Confrontation Clause,
“[t]he Framers were concerned with a typical witness—one who
perceived an event that gave rise to a personal belief in some aspect of
the defendant’s guilt”—not with “an analyst who conducts a scientific
test far removed from the crime.” 39 To support this claim, the dissent
cites the established framing-era practice of admitting copyists’
affidavits without confrontation. 40 Then, as now, prosecutors often
relied on official records to prove elements of an offense, and as today,
original records could not always be brought to court.41 Modernly,
photocopiers and certifications from records custodians have resolved
this dilemma, but at the Framers’ time, copyists reproduced the records
by hand. Because a trial could turn on a copyist’s “honesty and
diligence,” the copyist would also “prepare[] an affidavit certifying that
the copy [was] true and accurate.” 42 Although the copies and
accompanying affidavits had “been made for the purpose of introducing
the copies into evidence at trial,” early American courts routinely
admitted them in criminal cases.43
Under the Melendez-Diaz Court’s holding, copyists would have to
provide live testimony: their affidavits are “formal out-of-court
statement[s] offered for the truth of two matters (the copyist’s honesty
and the copy’s accuracy), and . . . prepared for a criminal prosecution.” 44
Indeed, the dissent argues, “one possible reading of the Court’s opinion”
likewise demands confrontation of modern records custodians, whose
unconfronted certifications of accuracy have long sufficed to
authenticate public and business records.45

years” and that had “extend[ed] across at least 35 States and six Federal Courts of Appeals,” id. at
2543; see also id. at 2558-61 (cataloging hundreds of decisions as evidence for this proposition). In
a sense, this argument comes too late. Most of the cases the dissent cites in support of its claim rely
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Roberts, on “its since-rejected theory that unconfronted
testimony was admissible as long as it bore indicia of reliability,” or on state law. See id. at 2533
(majority opinion). To the extent the Court has upended established practice with respect to the
admission of scientific evidence, the crucial rupture occurred six years ago, with Crawford. Unless
either the majority has misread Crawford or that case was wrongly decided, the dissent’s catalog of
precedent is beside the point.
39. Id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. See id. at 2553 (citing bigamy, for which marriage records were required, as an example).
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2546-47.
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In response, the majority contends that a copyist’s authority was
limited: he could “‘certify to the correctness of a copy of a record kept
in his office,’ but had ‘no authority to furnish, as evidence for the trial of
a lawsuit, his interpretation of what the record contains or shows, or to
certify to its substance or effect.’” 46 In the majority’s view, that this
lone historical exception to its reading of the Confrontation Clause was
“narrowly circumscribed” “vindicates the general rule.”47 Copyists
could authenticate evidence, but they could not create it, as the analysts
in Melendez-Diaz had done. 48
Intuitively, the distinction between an affidavit offered to prove a
defendant’s guilt, and an affidavit offered to prove that some other piece
of evidence is what it purports to be, seems right. Yet, both are created
solely to be introduced at trial, and both are offered for their truth,
placing them squarely within the Court’s definition of testimonial
hearsay. As a logical matter, it is unclear precisely why copyists’ and
authenticating witnesses’ “narrowly circumscribed” authority should
exempt them from confrontation.49 One could argue that the authority of
a pure character witness—one who testifies to a percipient witness’s
character for truthfulness but otherwise lacks personal knowledge of
facts relevant to the case—is equally circumscribed. He may attest to
the fact witness’s general veracity but not the substance of the witness’s
testimony. Does the Confrontation Clause therefore permit prosecutors
to bolster witnesses’ credibility with affidavits? Moreover, as the
dissent asks, why should “laboratory analysts’ authority . . . not also be
deemed ‘narrowly circumscribed’ so that they, too, may be excused from
testifying”? 50
The majority could have more effectively deflated the dissent’s
argument by simply acknowledging the apparent existence of a historical
exception to Crawford without attempting to rationalize it. The Court
did as much in Crawford itself with the traditional exception for
testimonial dying declarations.51 The existence of a single class of

46. Id. at 2539 (majority opinion) (quoting State v. Wilson, 75 So. 95, 97 (La. 1917)).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 2553 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Indeed, “[d]etermining whether a witness’
authority is ‘narrowly circumscribed’ has nothing to do with Crawford’s testimonial framework.”
Id.
50. Id.
51. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004) (observing that, “[a]lthough
many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those that
clearly are,” and concluding that “[i]f this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui
generis”).

STEVENS_CONLAW_2010-2011.DOC

90

AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY

6/2/2011 1:50 PM

[2:81

“unconventional” witnesses whose unconfronted testimonial statements
were traditionally admissible neither proves the existence of other such
classes nor vitiates the general rule.52 And copyists’ certificates aside,
early American courts did require confrontation for other types of
“unconventional” witnesses. 53 Although courts routinely admitted
copyists’ affidavits to authenticate official records, a clerk’s “certificate
attesting to the fact that the clerk had searched for a particular relevant
record and failed to find it,” did not receive the same treatment.54 Such
affidavits—like those of the laboratory analysts in Melendez-Diaz—
“would serve as substantive evidence against the defendant whose guilt
depended on the nonexistence of the record for which the clerk
searched.” 55 Accordingly, their authors were subject to confrontation. 56
Three nineteenth-century cases suggest that the same rule applied to
forensic analysts of that era: “[i]n all three cases, defendants—who were
prosecuted for selling adulterated milk—objected to the admission of the
state chemists’ certificates of analysis,” and in all three cases, the court
overruled their objections after the prosecution “came forward with live

52. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538.
53. See id. at 2539 & n.9.
54. Id. at 2539. Today, these documents are known as CNRs, short for certificate of
nonexistence of record, or of no record. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d 581,
583 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Burgos, 539 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2008); Tabaka v. District
of Columbia, 976 A.2d 173, 175 (D.C. 2009). Four days after issuing its decision in MelendezDiaz, the Court issued a GVR order—granting certiorari, vacating the decision below, and
remanding for reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz—in a case in which the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals had concluded that a CNR was non-testimonial. See United States v. Norwood,
555 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 491 (2009).
The Court typically issues GVR orders
[w]here intervening developments, or recent developments that we have reason to
believe the court below did not fully consider, reveal a reasonable probability that the
decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given the
opportunity for further consideration, and where it appears that such a redetermination
may determine the ultimate outcome of the litigation . . . .
Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996) (emphasis added). The Norwood GVR order
strongly hinted that CNRs are testimonial under Melendez-Diaz, and since then, lower courts have
consistently reached that conclusion. See, e.g., Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d at 585-86; Tabaka, 976
A.2d at 175; Washington v. State, 18 So. 3d 1221, 1223-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). Cf. United
States v. Norwood, 603 F.3d 1063, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended on denial of rehearing en
banc) (government conceded that CNR’s author should have been made available to testify, but
court held that any error was harmless); United States v. Madarikan, 356 F. App’x 532, 534 (2d Cir.
2009) (same).
55. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539.
56. Id.
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witnesses.” 57 While not definitive, these cases raise “doubt as to the
admissibility of the certificates without opportunity for crossexamination.” 58
Thus, the historical record does not support the dissent’s theory. At
the time of the framing, its binary scheme of “conventional” and
“unconventional” witnesses did not govern whether confrontation was
required. But, history does not unequivocally support the majority’s
holding, either. In Crawford, the Court relied principally on “the
historical background of the [Confrontation] Clause to understand its
meaning,” and it examined numerous early cases to ascertain how the
Framers would have understood the common-law right before
concluding that the Clause applies to testimonial statements. 59 In
Melendez-Diaz, the dissent identifies a second category of hearsay
statements (in addition to dying declarations) that, though testimonial,
were routinely admissible absent confrontation in the Framers’ era.
These exceptions may not invalidate the rule, but they do give rise to a
colorable argument that the rule is overbroad. The Melendez-Diaz
dissent could have pointed to mounting evidence that the Crawford
Court misread its history to reach an erroneously expansive holding.
Rather than launch a frontal assault on Crawford, however, the dissent
opts for intellectual subterfuge, arguing that Crawford did not hold what
the majority claims it did.
C.

Crawford’s Holding

The dissent disputes the majority’s reading of Crawford and of
Davis v. Washington, in which the Court addressed Crawford’s
application to statements made under police interrogation. 60 The dissent
contends that in interpreting the Confrontation Clause, Crawford and
Davis used the adjective “‘testimonial’” only to “avoid the awkward
phrasing required by reusing the noun ‘witness.’” 61 By reading
Crawford to hold “that anyone who makes a testimonial statement is a
witness for purposes of the Confrontation Clause,” 62 the majority had

57. Id. at 2539 n.9 (citing Commonwealth v. Waite, 93 Mass. 264, 266 (1865)); see also
Shivers v. Newton, 45 N.J.L. 469, 476 (Sup. Ct. 1883); State v. Campbell, 13 A. 585, 586 (N.H.
1888)).
58. Id.
59. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-56 (2004).
60. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 2552.
62. Id. at 2543.
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“transform[ed] that turn of phrase into a new and sweeping legal rule.”63
Crawford and Davis may have “suggested that any testimonial
statement, by any person, no matter how distant from the defendant and
the crime, is subject to” confrontation,64 but “th[is] suggestion was not
part of the holding of Crawford or Davis.” 65 Rather, these cases’
holdings extend no further than their facts, and in both, the hearsay
declarants whose statements lie at issue—“women who had seen, and in
two cases been the victim of, the crime in question”—were conventional
witnesses. 66 In short, the Court’s discussion of “testimonial” statements
was just dicta.
The Melendez-Diaz majority does not meet this argument directly,
evidently trusting to the unambiguous prose in Crawford and Davis to
settle the question in its favor. Indeed, although the words “we hold” do
not appear in Crawford, the opinion clearly telegraphs its purpose:
rather than select or extrapolate from an existing rule to resolve the facts
before it, the Court intends to deduce a new rule through application of
first principles. 67 After examining the constitutional text and the
historical record, the Court hazards two conclusions: (1) “even if the
Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that
is its primary object”; and (2) “the Framers would not have allowed
admission of testimonial [hearsay] of a witness who did not appear at
trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a
prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 68 Thus construed, the Clause
applied to the hearsay statements Crawford challenged, and because he
had had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, their admission
over his objection was error. 69
The Crawford Court “readily concede[d]” that applying the untilthen-prevailing Roberts test would not have changed the outcome. 70
But, it explained, Crawford was “one of those rare cases” that “reveals a
fundamental failure on our part to interpret the Constitution in a way that
secures its intended constraint on judicial discretion,” and that thus
compels a plenary reinterpretation of the constitutional provision

63. Id. at 2552.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 2543.
67. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-47 (2004) (turning to constitutional text and
“historical background of the [Confrontation] Clause” to resolve the case).
68. See id. at 53-54; accord id. at 59.
69. See id. at 61, 68.
70. Id. at 67.
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concerned. 71 In the final paragraphs of its opinion, the Court
summarized the results of this process: “Where testimonial evidence is
at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law
required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination.” 72
If the absence of the words “we hold” from this sentence creates
ambiguity as to its import, Davis eliminates all room for doubt. Davis
required the Court to determine whether and under what circumstances
the Confrontation Clause applies to hearsay statements made during
police interrogation.73 In setting forth the governing law, the Court
states that in Crawford,
we held that [the Confrontation Clause] bars “admission of testimonial
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity
for cross-examination.” A critical portion of this holding, and the
portion central to resolution of the two cases now before us, is the
phrase “testimonial statements.” Only statements of this sort cause the
declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation
Clause. 74

Davis thus makes clear that Crawford held precisely what the
Melendez-Diaz dissent insists it did not: that “anyone who makes a
testimonial statement is a witness for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause.” 75
Lower courts have certainly understood Crawford’s holding in this
way. 76 True, before Melendez-Diaz, lower courts had split as to whether
71. See id.
72. Id. at 68.
73. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817 (2006) (framing the issue as “when
statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a crime scene are
‘testimonial’ and thus subject to the requirements of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause”).
74. Id. at 821 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
75. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Davis’s reading of Crawford produced little controversy at the time. Eight members of the Court—
including all four Melendez-Diaz dissenters—joined the Davis majority. Compare Melendez-Diaz,
129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Alito joined Justice Kennedy’s
dissent), with Davis, 547 U.S. at 815 (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court). Indeed, two MelendezDiaz dissenters—Justices Kennedy and Breyer—formed part of the seven-justice majority
responsible for Crawford. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 37 (Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 472 F.3d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v.
Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 290 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 664-65 (7th Cir.
2006); People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 133-34 (Cal. 2007); State v. Lopez, 974 So.2d 340, 345-46
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forensic analysts’ certificates and reports were admissible under
Crawford. 77 But their decisions consistently turned on whether the
challenged documents were testimonial, not on whether their authors
were conventional witnesses. Some courts deemed forensic reports nontestimonial because the assertions they contained were not overtly
accusatory. 78 Other courts relied on a dictum in Crawford. Observing

(Fla. 2008); People v. Taylor, 759 N.W.2d 361, 377 (Mich. 2008); Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730,
734-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
77. Compare United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007) (raw data generated
by chromatograph non-testimonial); United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2006) (blood test
result non-testimonial); Pruitt v. Alabama, 954 So.2d 611 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (compound
analysis report non-testimonial); Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (DNA test result non-testimonial); People v.
Leach, 908 N.E.2d 120, 174 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (autopsy report non-testimonial); State v. Lackey,
120 P.3d 332 (Kan. 2005) (same); State v. Anderson, 942 So.2d 625 (La. Ct. App. 2006);
Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005) (compound analysis report nontestimonial); State v. O’Maley, 932 A.2d 1 (N.H. 2007) (blood alcohol analysis result nontestimonial); State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137 (N.C. 2006) (serology report non-testimonial); State v.
Dedman, 102 P.3d 628 (N.M. 2004) (blood alcohol analysis result non-testimonial); People v.
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008) (raw data generated by private DNA lab non-testimonial);
State v. Crager, 879 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio 2007) (same); Campos v. State, 256 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. App.
2008) (autopsy report and DNA report containing only raw data non-testimonial), with State v.
Moss, 160 P.3d 1143 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (blood analysis report testimonial); Hinojos-Mendoza v.
People, 169 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2007) (lab report testimonial); Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1
(D.C. 2006) (same); State v. Johnson, 982 So.2d 672 (Fla. 2008) (compound analysis report
testimonial); Jackson v. State, 891 N.E.2d 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367
(Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (lab report testimonial); People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610 (Mich. Ct. App.
2005) (same); State v. Caufield, 722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn. 2006) (same); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d
663 (Mo. 2007) (same); City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203 (Nev. 2005) (affidavit from
nurse who drew blood for alcohol analysis testimonial); State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2007) (state crime lab report and blood-draw certificate both testimonial); Rawlins, 884
N.E.2d 1019 (latent fingerprint analysis reports testimonial); State v. Smith, No. 1-05-39, 2006 WL
846342 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2006) (compound analysis report testimonial); State v. Birchfield,
157 P.3d 216 (Or. 2007) (same); Acevedo v. State, 255 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. App. 2008) (fingerprint
comparison report testimonial). Cf. Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 853 (Md. 2006) (holding that
factual observations in autopsy report are non-testimonial, but that contested conclusions and
opinions “central to the determination of corpus delicti or criminal agency” are testimonial).
78. See, e.g., Lackey, 120 P.3d at 351-52 (concluding that “factual, routine, descriptive, and
nonanalytical findings made in an autopsy report are nontestimonial”); Forte, 629 S.E.2d at 143
(admitting unsworn serology report as non-testimonial because it was “neutral” and contained
“objective” analysis “having the power to exonerate as well as convict”); Dedman, 102 P.3d at 636
(finding blood alcohol analysis report non-testimonial because it was “routine, non-adversarial, and
made to ensure an accurate measurement”).
The State tried this argument in Melendez-Diaz, but the Court rejected it for two reasons.
See 129 S. Ct. at 2533-34. First, the Sixth Amendment “contemplates two classes of witnesses—
those against the defendant,” whom the Confrontation Clause obliges the prosecution to produce,
“and those in his favor,” whom the Compulsory Process Clause entitles him to subpoena. Id. at
2534. “[T]here is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow
immune from confrontation.” Id. Second, “[i]t is often, indeed perhaps usually, the case that an
adverse witness’s testimony,” though crucial to the prosecution’s case, is not accusatory on its face,
but courts have never exempted such witnesses from confrontation. See id.
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that most traditional “hearsay exceptions covered statements that by
their nature were not testimonial,” the Crawford Court cited business
records as an example, 79 and many lower courts either gave this
statement substantial weight or read it as a bright-line rule. 80 After
Davis, some lower courts admitting analysts’ certificates and reports
absent confrontation did rely, in part, on the fact that the records had
been created near-contemporaneously with the observations and
conclusions they recited. 81 Yet these courts reasoned that this
characteristic rendered the reports non-testimonial—not that it marked
their authors as “unconventional” witnesses outside the Confrontation
Clause. 82 Indeed, prior to Melendez-Diaz, no court had read Crawford
as applying the Clause only to “conventional” witnesses.
The dissent turns up little evidence in Crawford or in the historical
record to support its constitutional theory, but that theory, and the
dissent’s efforts to defend it, are meaningful, nevertheless. The dissent’s
theory failed to carry the day in Melendez-Diaz, but it represents how
four members of the Court view the Confrontation Clause. And in light
of Justice Thomas’s continued adherence to an independent reading of
the Clause, it marks a three-way split in the Court’s jurisprudence. In
the next two sections, I examine Justice Thomas’s view of the Clause
and explore the implications of this three-way doctrinal division.

79. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
80. See, e.g., Ellis, 460 F.3d at 921, 924-26 (concluding that medical records describing
results of blood and urine tests conducted by hospital at police request, while defendant was in
police custody, were non-testimonial because “[t]here is no indication that the observations
embodied in [the] records were made in anything but the ordinary course of business”); State v.
Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 638-39 (Ohio 2006) (agreeing with “the majority view under Crawford . . .
that autopsy records are admissible as business records”); Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 705-06 (admitting
drug analysis certificate because “it was akin to a business record, which the Court stated was not
testimonial in nature”).
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court clarified that while “[d]ocuments kept in the regular course
of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status . . . that is not the case if
the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.” 129 S. Ct. at
2538 (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(6)). The same limitation applies to the hearsay exception for public
records. See id. Thus, records generated for use in litigation do not meet these exceptions, and
when the contemplated litigation is a criminal prosecution, the constitution further constrains their
admission. See id. (citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), and FED. R. EVID. 803(8)).
81. See, e.g., Geier, 161 P.3d at 139-40; O’Maley, 932 A.2d at 12; Crager, 879 N.E.2d at
756-57.
82. See supra note 81.
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Independent Voter

Justice Thomas first articulated his theory of the Confrontation
Clause in White v. Illinois. 83 Though written many years earlier, his
concurring opinion in that case foreshadows Crawford by questioning
the Court’s increasing conflation of the constitutional right to
confrontation with hearsay law, and by proposing that the Court
reconsider its understanding of that right in light of the historical
record. 84 As “one possible formulation” of the right, Justice Thomas
offered the following: “The federal constitutional right of confrontation
extends to any witness who actually testifies at trial, but the
Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only
insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.” 85 In Crawford,
the Court quoted this proposal and two others as possible “formulations
of th[e] core class of ‘testimonial’ statements.” 86 The hearsay statement
challenged in Crawford—a confession given during custodial
interrogation—fell squarely within the category Justice Thomas defined
in White, and he joined the Court’s opinion in Crawford without writing
separately. 87
In Hammon, however, his was the lone voice of dissent. 88 In Davis,
the Court held that a woman’s statements to a 911 operator, made while
the defendant was attacking her, were non-testimonial because the
interrogation’s primary purpose was to resolve an ongoing emergency. 89
But in Hammon, the companion case, the Court held that an assault
victim’s statements to police after the officers had secured the scene
were testimonial because their primary purpose was to provide evidence
against her assailant. 90 For Justice Thomas, neither woman’s statements
were testimonial as that term should be defined. 91 In his view, the
Confrontation Clause’s history makes clear that testimony involves
“some degree of solemnity.” 92 Thus, “[a]ffidavits, depositions, and prior

83. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
84. See id. at 358-66.
85. Id. at 365.
86. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004).
87. See id. at 38-40.
88. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
89. See id. at 828 (majority opinion).
90. See id. at 830.
91. Id. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
92. Id. at 836.
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testimony”—statements that “are, by their very nature, taken through a
formalized process”—are testimonial, as are “confessions . . . extracted
by police in a formal manner,” such as during custodial interrogation.93
Otherwise, unless offered by the prosecution “to evade confrontation,”
statements in response to police interrogation that lack “indicia of
formality” do not trigger the constitutional right to confrontation. 94
In Melendez-Diaz, Justice Thomas joined the majority but wrote
separately, explaining that he had done so only because the certificates
of analysis were “‘quite plainly affidavits.’” 95 He has thus held
steadfastly to an independent—and thoroughly originalist—view of the
Confrontation Clause. 96 When, in his opinion, the Court has drifted too
far from the Clause’s original meaning, he has taken it to task. In Davis,
he criticized the primary purpose test as “disconnected from history and
unnecessary to prevent abuse” because, under certain circumstances, it

93. Id. at 836-37.
94. See id. at 840. Justice Thomas allowed that the Confrontation Clause forbids the
admission of even informal out-of-court statements in response to interrogation if the prosecution
attempts to use them “as a means of circumventing the literal right of confrontation,” but he did not
explain what he would view as an attempt at circumvention. See id. at 838. Later in the opinion,
however, he observes that in neither Davis nor Hammon did the prosecution “offer the women’s
hearsay evidence at trial to evade confrontation,” and in supporting citations, he notes that in each
case, the state endeavored to secure the declarant’s appearance at trial. Id. at 840. The witness in
Hammon ignored a subpoena, and the state could not locate the witness in Davis at the time of trial.
Id. These citations suggest that in Justice Thomas’ view, an informal out-of-court statement only
implicates the Confrontation Clause when the declarant is otherwise available to testify at trial. Or
conversely, the Clause requires unavailability, but not a prior opportunity for cross-examination, for
statements that would be testimonial but for their informality.
95. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
96. In Giles v. California, where the testimonial quality of the victim-declarant’s statement
was not at issue, Justice Thomas concurred separately to note his continued adherence to his
previously-expressed views—under which the victim’s statement to a police officer during an
informal dialogue would not be testimonial. 128 S. Ct. at 2678, 2693-94 (2008) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
Curiously, Justice Alito also concurred separately in Giles to express doubt as to whether
the victim—who spoke to the officer three weeks before her death, and who, crying as she spoke,
related how the defendant had beaten, choked, and threatened her, id. at 2680-81 —was a “witness”
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring). The basis for
these doubts is unclear. As one who had perceived an event that gave her personal knowledge of
some aspect of the defendant’s guilt, the victim in Giles was undoubtedly a “conventional” witness
as defined by the dissenting opinion Justice Alito joined in Melendez-Diaz. See Melendez-Diaz, 129
S. Ct. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). And the factual circumstances surrounding her statement
closely resembled those in Hammon, where Justice Alito joined the majority in holding that the
victim-declarant’s statements were testimonial. Compare Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2680-81, and People
v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 846 (Ct. App. 2004) (depublished when California Supreme Court
granted review), with Davis, 547 U.S. at 819-20.
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captured responses to informal police questioning. 97 The Davis majority
reasoned that in the modern era, “[i]t imports sufficient formality . . .
that lies to [examining police] officers are criminal offenses.”98 For
Justice Thomas, however, “[t]he possibility that an oral declaration of
past fact to a police officer, if false, could result in legal consequences
. . . may render honesty in casual conversations with police officers
important[, but] [i]t does not . . . render those conversations solemn or
formal in the ordinary meanings of those terms.”99 He also disparaged
the test’s unpredictable results. 100 In White, he had warned that
“[a]ttempts to draw a line between statements made in contemplation of
legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a
multitude of difficulties.” 101 Yet the Davis Court had drawn just such a
line by making the testimonial character of responses to police
interrogation dependent on the interrogation’s primary purpose.102
Because police officers who respond to a reported crime generally have
multiple motives for interrogating a witness, accurately identifying their
subjective, primary purpose would be impossible. 103 An objective test
aimed at “the function served by the interrogation” would be little better,
as it would “shift the ability to control whether a violation occurred from
the police and prosecutor to the judge,” whose hindsight purpose
assessment “would be unpredictable and not necessarily tethered to the
actual purpose for which the police performed the interrogation.”104

97. Davis, 547 U.S. at 838 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
98. Id. at 830 n.5 (majority opinion).
99. Id. at 838 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
100. Id. at 838.
101. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
102. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 838-40 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
103. Id. at 839.
104. Id. at 839-40. Justice Thomas did not address a third plausible reading of the primary
purpose test—that purpose should be evaluated from an objective declarant’s point of view. Two of
the three formulations of “testimonial statements” quoted in Crawford incorporate an objective
declarant standard: “‘ex-parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent . . . [including] similar
pre-trial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,’” Crawford,
541 U.S. at 51 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 23); and “‘statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would
be available for use at a later trial,” id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 3). And in Davis, the Court emphasized, albeit in a
footnote, that whether made under interrogation or otherwise, “it is in the final analysis the
declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to
evaluate.” 547 U.S. at 822 n.1. Commentators have split as to whether the Davis test incorporates
the interrogator’s perspective or that of a reasonable declarant, but most have acknowledged that the
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Despite the misgivings Justice Thomas expressed in Davis, purpose
plays a continued role in Melendez-Diaz, demonstrating that it remains
an important factor for the majority’s other four members. In holding
that the certificates of analysis were testimonial, the Court emphasized
that “under Massachusetts law the[ir] sole purpose . . . was to provide
‘prima facie evidence’” in a criminal trial.105 In contrast, “medical
reports created for treatment purposes” and traditional business
records—those created in the regular course of a business activity
unrelated to the production of evidence or the prosecution of crimes—
were inherently non-testimonial.106 The Court added that “documents
prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may well
qualify as nontestimonial records.” 107 Yet this class of records illustrates
the problematic malleability of a purpose-focused test that Justice
Thomas foresaw in White and disparaged in Davis. Consider, for
example, calibration and maintenance records for a breathalyzer
machine owned and operated by a law enforcement agency. Because
purpose can be considered at varying levels of abstraction, courts have
split as to whether such records are testimonial under Melendez-Diaz. 108
Some courts have reasoned that they are created for routine,
administrative purposes and not for any particular prosecution, and are
accordingly non-testimonial. 109 But others have found that police
departments maintain and calibrate breathalyzer machines only to
facilitate their production of admissible evidence, so the resulting
records are testimonial. 110

opinion admits of the latter reading. See, e.g, Friedman, supra note 1, at 560-62 (describing
ambiguity in the Davis opinion, contending that “the declarant’s perspective is the better one,” and
suggesting that the Court may have referenced the interrogator’s purpose because it would logically
influence a reasonable declarant’s perceptions in the context of interrogation); Michael S. Pardo,
Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REV. 119, 172-74 (2007) (contending that Davis leaves open four
possibilities for “when a statement becomes testimonial for confrontation purposes”—when it is
testimonial from the interrogator’s perspective, the declarant’s perspective, either, or both—and
advocating an either/or standard); Gregory M. O’Neil, Comment, Davis & Hammon: Redefining
the Constitutional Right to Confrontation, 40 CONN. L. REV. 511, 544-47 & n.221 (2007)
(discussing varying interpretations of whose perspective governs, and advocating a declarantfocused test).
105. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (quoting MASS. GEN.
LAWS, ch. 111, § 13).
106. Id. at 2533 n.2, 2538.
107. Id. at 2532 n.1.
108. See infra notes 171-179 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Forstell, 656 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580-81 (E.D. Va. 2009); State v.
Bergin, 217 P.3d 1087, 1088-90 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
110. See, e.g., People v. Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846-47 (City Ct. 2010); People v.
Heyanka, 886 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (Dist. Ct. 2009).
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In most cases, however, lower courts need not entangle themselves
in such purpose assessments. Because Justice Thomas provided the
decisive fifth vote in Melendez-Diaz, as the “position taken by th[e]
Member[] who concurred in the judgment[] on the narrowest grounds,”
his opinion reflects “the holding of the Court.”111 That opinion refers to
two classes of extrajudicial statements that, in Justice Thomas’s view,
qualify as testimonial: (1) those “‘contained in formalized testimonial
materials’”; 112 and (2) those that are “‘sufficiently formal to resemble’”
the seventeenth-century ex parte witness examinations that prompted the
Framers to constitutionalize the common-law confrontation right.113
Thus, Melendez-Diaz applies to affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
confessions, Mirandized or custodial interrogations—and perhaps not
much else.

111. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976); accord Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
Few lower courts applying Melendez-Diaz have read its holding as limited to “formalized
testimonial materials,” and those courts treating Justice Thomas’s concurrence as procedurally
determinative have diverged in its substantive application. The New Mexico Supreme Court
acknowledged that Justice Thomas’s concurrence defines the bounds of Melendez-Diaz, but it
construed the class of “formalized testimonial materials” as including unsworn reports of drug and
blood-alcohol analyses. See State v. Aragon, 225 P.3d 1280, 1284-85 (N.M. 2010) (compound
analysis reports); State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8 (N.M. 2010) (results of gas chromatograph
analysis of defendant’s blood alcohol content). In contrast, at least one California court has
declined to apply Melendez-Diaz to unsworn forensic and laboratory reports, which do not
obviously constitute “formalized testimonial materials,” or to the in-court recitation of their contents
by a live witness. See People v. Vargas, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 578, 587 (Ct. App. 2009) (concluding
that, “because of the limited nature of Justice Thomas’ concurrence, the precedential value of the
majority’s analysis” equating “conventional” witnesses who testify to past events, and “analysts”
who make near-contemporaneous observations, “is unclear as applied to a laboratory analyst’s
report or a similar forensic report”). Distinguishing Melendez-Diaz, Vargas instead followed the
California Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in People v. Geier. Geier held that a DNA analyst’s
report and notes—about which another expert gave in-court testimony—were non-testimonial in
part because they documented the analyst’s contemporaneous observations. See 161 P.3d 104, 13840 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2856 (2009). Although the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Geier, this action cannot be read as an implicit endorsement of Geier’s reasoning
because Geier held, in the alternative, that even if constitutional error had occurred, it had been
harmless. See 161 P.3d at 140. The California Supreme Court has granted review in several postMelendez-Diaz cases, presumably to resolve Geier’s fate. See, e.g., People v. Benitez, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 39 (Ct. App. 2010), rev. granted, 230 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2010); People v. Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr.
3d 702 (Ct. App. 2009), rev. granted, 220 P.3d 240 (Cal. 2009); People v. Gutierrez, 99 Cal. Rptr.
3d 369 (Ct. App. 2009), rev. granted, 220 P.3d 239 (Cal. 2009); People v. Lopez, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d
825 (Ct. App. 2009), rev. granted, 220 P.3d 240 (Cal. 2009); People v. Rutterschmidt, 98 Cal. Rptr.
3d 390, 412 (Ct. App. 2009), rev. granted and op. superseded by, 220 P.3d 239 (Cal. 2009).
112. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
113. See id. (quoting Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
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Doctrinal Tangle

He may have cast the tie-breaking vote in Melendez-Diaz, but
Justice Thomas will not necessarily play the role of kingmaker in future
Confrontation Clause cases. Melendez-Diaz split the Court into three
camps, but their views do not lie along a one-dimensional spectrum,
with Justice Thomas alone in the middle.114 Four Justices believe that
the Clause covers “testimonial” statements as defined in Crawford; 115
for Justice Thomas, the Clause reaches only “formalized testimonial
materials” and comparably formal oral testimony—in essence, a subset
of testimonial statements under Crawford; and four Justices would apply
the Clause only to statements uttered by “conventional” witnesses that
an objective declarant would anticipate could be used in a later
prosecution, except when such statements were made under police
interrogation to resolve an ongoing emergency. 116 For five members of
the Court, the statement was what mattered. They would examine its
content, context, purpose, and, for Justice Thomas, its formality, to
determine whether it constitutes testimony, such that the declarant would
be a witness within the Confrontation Clause. The four Melendez-Diaz
dissenters, however, would start with the declarant, asking whether he
has perceived an event giving “him personal knowledge of some aspect
of the defendant’s guilt.” 117 If so, then he is a witness within the Clause.
And if circumstances objectively indicated that his statements would be
available for use at a later trial, but that enabling police interrogators to
meet an ongoing emergency was not their primary purpose, then those
statements would implicate the confrontation right.
This doctrinal discord has already produced a curious mix of
results. In Davis, a conventional witness’s statement was nontestimonial
under Crawford, lacked formality, and related near-contemporaneous
observations for the purpose of resolving an ongoing emergency, so the

114. But see G. Michael Fenner, Today’s Confrontation Clause (After Crawford and
Melendez-Diaz), 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 39-40 (2009) (contending that “[f]our Justices believe
that the coverage of the Confrontation Clause is quite broad, four believe it is quite narrow, and
Justice Thomas’s view falls in the middle”).
115. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in
Melendez-Diaz as well as the majority opinions (also written by Justice Scalia) in Crawford and
Davis.
116. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Alito joined Justice Kennedy’s dissent in
Melendez-Diaz as well as the majority opinion in Davis. Justices Kennedy and Breyer were among
the Crawford majority.
117. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Court unanimously declined to find a right to confrontation. 118 In
Melendez-Diaz, where an unconventional witness’s testimonial
statement satisfied Justice Thomas’s formality requirement, five
members of the Court agreed that confrontation was necessary. 119 But in
Hammon, where a conventional witness’s statement was testimonial
under Crawford but not formalized, the Court required confrontation,
notwithstanding Justice Thomas’s contrary view. 120 Synthesized, these
results support the following proposition: a hearsay statement implicates
the Confrontation Clause only if it is testimonial under Crawford and
Davis, and only if either the declarant is a conventional witness or the
statement bears sufficient hallmarks of formality.
This proposition may serve as a rule of thumb for how the
Melendez-Diaz Court would decide future cases, but it is hardly a
constitutional rule. Though rightly criticized for its failure to precisely
define the universe of “testimonial” statements,121 Crawford at least
articulated a clear rule, apparently favored by a seven-member majority
of the Court. 122 In Davis and Hammon, Justice Thomas expressed a
distinct interpretation of the Confrontation Clause that diverged from
that followed by the Court, but consensus evidently reigned among the
other eight Justices. Giles v. California produced sharp divisions, but
the dissenters did not question the underlying constitutional principle—
that anyone who makes a testimonial statement is a witness within the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause. 123 Melendez-Diaz, however,
118. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827-28 (2006); id. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
119. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531-32; id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
120. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 829-30; id. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
121. Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized this omission, noting that while the Court might be
willing to leave the task of fully defining “testimonial” for another day, prosecutors would need
such a definition immediately. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75-76 (2004) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in the judgment) (“Rules of criminal evidence are applied every day in courts
throughout the country, and parties should not be left in the dark in this manner.”). Commentators
echoed these sentiments. See, e.g., Brooks Holland, Testimonial Statements Under Crawford, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 281, 281 (2005) (Crawford “cast[] a shadow of uncertainty over a major
component of criminal practice”); Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57
STAN. L. REV. 569, 587 (2004) (citing uncertainty resulting from Crawford’s failure to define
“testimonial” as chief among the decision’s costs).
122. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor concurred only in the judgment, explaining
that they would not have overruled Roberts. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
123. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, disagreed with the majority’s
conclusion that a defendant forfeits his confrontation right by wrongdoing only when he committed
the wrongful act for the purpose of rendering a witness unavailable. See Giles v. California, 128 S.
Ct. 2678, 2695, 2698-99 (2008).
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marks an abrupt retreat from Crawford’s simplicity. To be sure,
Crawford remains good law, but it faces an uncertain future. A mere six
years after Crawford’s criminal-procedure revolution, only four Justices
still endorsed its basic formula, and no single view of the Confrontation
Clause held sway with a majority of the Court.
Since the Court decided Melendez-Diaz, however, its composition
has changed. Two members of the majority, Justices Souter and
Stevens, have retired and been replaced, respectively, by Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan. The basic Crawford formula has lost two of its
four adherents. Its future, and that of the Court’s Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence more broadly, will depend on the two newest Justices.124
They will have an early opportunity to stake out their positions next
term, when the Court will hear another Confrontation Clause case,
Bryant v. Michigan, in which the Court will again consider confrontation
of hearsay statements made under police interrogation.125

124. After Justice Sotomayor joined the Court, it granted certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia, and
some commentators suggested that this spelled an early demise for Melendez-Diaz. See Stephen
Wills Murphy & Darryl K. Brown, The Confrontation Clause and the High Stakes of the Court’s
Consideration of Briscoe v. Virginia, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 97, 100 (2010). In Briscoe, the
Virginia Supreme Court assumed that a certificate of analysis akin to the one in Melendez-Diaz was
testimonial but held that Briscoe had waived his confrontation right by failing to subpoena the
analyst, as permitted by a Virginia statute. See Magruder v. Virginia, 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008),
cert. granted sub. nom. Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009). The case presented two issues:
whether Briscoe had a right to confront the analyst, and if so, whether permitting him to subpoena
the analyst satisfied the right. When the Court accepted Briscoe a mere four days after issuing
Melendez-Diaz—which had resolved the second issue as well as the first, albeit in dicta, see infra
note 155—observers speculated that the addition of a former prosecutor to the Court had given the
dissenters a fifth vote to overrule or limit Melendez-Diaz. See Murphy & Brown, supra, at 99-100.
The actual outcome was anticlimactic. After full briefing and oral argument, the Court issued a
terse per curiam opinion vacating and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of MelendezDiaz. See 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010). This result suggests either that Justice Sotomayor agreed in full
with the Melendez-Diaz majority, or that she has joined the majority but may support future
limitations on the decision. See Murphy & Brown, supra, at 105-06.
125. See People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65 (Mich. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1685 (2010).
Professor Richard Friedman, a prominent Confrontation Clause scholar whose writing influenced
the Court’s decision in Crawford, see 541 U.S. at 61, anticipates that the Court will answer four
questions in Bryant: (1) whether the testimonial character of a statement made under police
interrogation should be assessed from the speaker’s perspective or the interrogator’s; (2) whether a
statement must be “formal” to be testimonial, and if so, whether that requirement is satisfied if an
objective declarant would expect the statement to be available for prosecutorial use; (3) whether
statements in response to police interrogation during an ongoing emergency are testimonial if they
do not directly relate to resolving the emergency; and (4) whether the fact that a suspect remains at
large qualifies as an ongoing emergency, even if he poses no immediate danger to the declarant.
See Richard D. Friedman, More on Bryant, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG (Mar. 2, 2010, 8:30 AM),
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/.
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III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Melendez-Diaz may well represent Crawford’s swansong. If so,
Crawford has gone out with a bang. As one reads the opinions, the
doctrinal debate between the majority and the dissent pales in
comparison to their fierce disagreement over the decision’s real-world
impact. Dismissing the decision’s practical benefits as “negligible,” the
dissent charges that it will impose astronomical costs on federal, state,
and local governments, and that “[g]uilty defendants will go free . . . as a
direct result of today’s decision.” 126 The majority scoffs at these dire
predictions, and it challenges the dissent’s assertion that crossexamination of forensic analysts will prove an empty formalism. 127
Neither the majority nor the dissent gets its cost-benefit analysis
quite right. The dissent exaggerates the decision’s costs, but the
majority’s assessment is far too optimistic. Compliance with MelendezDiaz will impose a substantial burden on government agencies and
coffers, regardless of how narrowly lower courts construe the Court’s
holding, and despite inherent limitations on its scope. On the other side
of the scales, however, both the majority and the dissent give short shrift
to the decision’s potential benefits. Cross-examination of forensic
analysts will enable jurors to make better-informed reliability
assessments of forensic evidence and will thereby serve the truthseeking function of criminal trials. Moreover, it will afford defense
counsel an opportunity to dispel the myth that forensic evidence is
infallible. Requiring forensic analysts to appear for cross-examination
may, as the Melendez-Diaz dissent insists it will, result in some guilty
defendants walking free, but it may also prevent the conviction of
innocent defendants based on speculation disguised as science.
I open this Part by assessing the practical costs of Melendez-Diaz. I
present and critique the dissent’s alarmist arguments as well as the
majority’s sanguine ripostes before arguing that the reality falls
somewhere in between. I then turn to the decision’s benefits, framing
my analysis of how cross-examination of forensic analysts will advance
the truth-seeking process as a response to the Melendez-Diaz dissent.

126. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2549-50 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
127. See id. at 2536-38, 2540-42 (majority opinion).
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Costs

Melendez-Diaz confirms that Crawford applies to forensic analysts
and laboratory technicians who evaluate or perform tests on physical
evidence. 128 From now on, if prosecutors wish to introduce these
persons’ testimonial hearsay into evidence, they must afford defendants
the opportunity for cross-examination. 129 While in hindsight, this rule
follows logically from Crawford, many jurisdictions had not adopted
it, 130 and compliance in these jurisdictions will impose administrative
and economic costs on government and the legal system. As the dissent
observes, given the often erratic schedules of criminal trials, a forensic
analyst called to testify due to Melendez-Diaz may “face the prospect of
waiting for days in a hallway outside the courtroom.” 131 Existing
backlogs at public crime laboratories will balloon as analysts spend more
time in court (or waiting outside) and less time in the lab. Fiscallystrapped state and local governments will struggle to hire sufficient
additional staff to take up the slack. In some cases, authors of forensic
reports will be genuinely unavailable at the time of trial, and if their
analyses are unrepeatable, and the prosecution’s case turns on forensic
evidence, guilty defendants may be acquitted, imposing a cost on
society.
The magnitude of these costs will depend on how many cases
Melendez-Diaz affects. On this point, the majority and the dissent
sharply diverge. By the dissent’s calculations, Melendez-Diaz will derail
countless prosecutions, 132 while the majority dismisses the dissent’s
projections as preposterous. 133 In this section, I first present these
competing views. I then independently assess the decision’s real-world
costs in light of inherent limitations on its scope, concluding that the
truth lies in the vast gap between the two camps’ assessments.
1. The Dissent’s Projections
Routine drug prosecutions like Melendez-Diaz are ubiquitous: in
2004, more than 18,000 drug trials occurred in state courts. 134 Counting
128. See id. at 2532, 2536-38.
129. Id. at 2532.
130. The majority identifies ten jurisdictions (nine states and the District of Columbia) as
already applying Crawford to forensic analysts. Id. at 2540, 2541 n.11. Thus, in forty-one states,
Melendez-Diaz will require a change in practice.
131. See id. at 2549 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 2549-50.
133. See id. at 2540 n.10 (majority opinion).
134. Id. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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plea bargains—in which the admissible evidence available to the
prosecution almost certainly influenced defendants’ decisions to forgo
trial—the states chalked up 362,850 felony drug convictions in that same
year. 135 Translating these numbers to the local level, the dissent
calculates that requiring confrontation of laboratory technicians who
weigh and identify controlled substances will impose “a crushing
burden.” 136 Based on the number of drug prosecutions in 2007, and
assuming a 95% plea bargain rate, each of Philadelphia’s 18 drug
analysts would be called to testify in more than 69 trials each year, and
each of Cleveland’s six analysts would be summoned in 117 cases. 137
If these figures were to prove accurate, Melendez-Diaz would have
staggering consequences for drug prosecutions nationwide. And as the
dissent emphasizes, the decision may affect not just drug cases, but all
cases in which the prosecution relies on forensic analyses. Given that
the FBI crime lab’s 500 employees “conduct over one million scientific
tests each year,” “[t]he Court’s decision means that before any one of
those million tests reaches a jury, at least one of the laboratory’s analysts
must board a plane, find his or her way to an unfamiliar courthouse, and
sit there waiting to read aloud notes made months ago.” 138 And the
decision may compel more than one of those analysts to follow these
steps. The dissent contends that Melendez-Diaz can be read to require
that every person who plays a role in conducting a forensic test—even
the contractor who calibrates the testing equipment—appear in court. 139
Indeed, in the dissent’s view, the decision can be read to require live
testimony for every link in the chain of custody for a piece of
evidence, 140 and even require custodians to take the stand to attest to the
accuracy of the copies of records they provide.141
Securing court appearances by all of these persons would present
a formidable logistical hurdle for the prosecution. To capitalize on that
fact, the dissent contends, a defendant will inevitably assert his right to
confront each and every one of them. 142 He may thereby hope to
negotiate a more favorable plea agreement or reduced sentence; 143 to
create delays that will lead to dismissal of the case on speedy trial
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 2549.
Id. at 2550.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2544-45.
See id. at 2546.
See id. at 2546-47.
See id. at 2556-57.
Id. at 2557.
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grounds; or, “where scientific evidence is necessary to prove an element
of the crime,” to earn an acquittal if the analyst is unavailable to
testify. 144 Indeed, the dissent argues, defense attorneys’ duty of zealous
advocacy will oblige them to put the prosecution to its proof by
demanding live testimony, even where the defense does not dispute the
identity of a substance or the source of other trace evidence. 145
Viewed from this perspective, the dissent’s prediction that
Melendez-Diaz may “disrupt or even end criminal prosecutions” looks
plausible. The criminal justice system might well collapse if, whenever
forensic evidence is introduced, every person who played a role in its
collection, processing, and analysis were required to provide live
testimony, and if live testimony were likewise required to authenticate
every document and to prove every link in the chain of custody for every
item.
2. The Majority’s Response
According to the majority, however, the dissent’s “back-of-theenvelope calculations regarding the number of court appearances that
will result from [its] ruling . . . rely on various unfounded
assumptions.” 146 The dissent assumes:
that the prosecution will place into evidence a drug analysis certificate
in every case; that the defendant will never stipulate to the nature of
the controlled substance; [and] that even where no such stipulation is
made, every defendant will object to the evidence or otherwise demand
the appearance of the analyst. 147

None of these assumptions is valid.
First, when the prosecution must prove the weight and/or identity of
a controlled substance to make out its prima facie case, it may do so
through means other than a drug certificate.148 This is equally true for
other forms of forensic evidence. Some prosecutors’ existing practice
may be to call testing analysts to deliver their results on the witness
stand. In the drugs context, prosecutors might also choose to present
testimony from an arresting officer if he is able to discern a substance’s
identity based on experience and observations. Or test results may be
offered not for their truth, but as part of the factual basis for a testifying
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 2556.
See id. at 2556-57.
See id. at 2540 n.10 (majority opinion).
Id.
See id. at 2542 n.14.
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expert’s opinion, in theory placing them outside Crawford. 149 A
prosecutor will rarely confront situations in which an analyst’s
testimonial hearsay is the sole means by which he can prove an element
of his case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, the majority opines, “[d]efense attorneys and their clients
will often stipulate to the nature of the substance in the ordinary drug
case.” 150 Where the defendant does not contest a substance’s identity—
for example, where the defense theory is that the defendant did not
knowingly possess the drugs, 151 or that they were for personal use and
not intended for sale—the majority deems it “unlikely that defense
counsel would insist on live testimony whose effect will be merely to
highlight rather than cast doubt on the forensic analysis,” or “to
antagonize the judge or jury by wasting their time with the appearance of
a witness whose testimony defense counsel does not intend to rebut in
any fashion.” 152
Third, it is not necessarily true that every defendant will assert his
confrontation right. Indeed, according to the majority, many states
already follow the rule announced in Melendez-Diaz, while many others
empower a defendant to demand confrontation but deem the right
waived if the defendant fails to assert it within a given time period after
“receiving notice of the prosecution’s intent to use a forensic analyst’s
report.” 153 That “the criminal justice system has not ground to a halt” in
these states strongly suggests that defendants often waive confrontation
of forensic analysts. 154 Further, in some other states, including
Massachusetts, “a defendant may subpoena the analyst to appear at trial,
and yet there is no indication that obstructionist defendants are abusing
that privilege.” 155
149. See infra Part III.A.3.b.
150. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542.
151. Melendez-Diaz’s defense theory was that “the prosecution had not shown that he had
possessed or dealt in the drugs.” Id. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 2542 (majority opinion).
153. See id. at 2540-41.
154. See id. at 2541.
155. Id. (citation omitted). Elsewhere in its opinion, the Court explains that empowering a
defendant to subpoena the analyst will not satisfy the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 2540. “[T]he
Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the
defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.” Id. “Converting the prosecution’s duty
under the Confrontation Clause into the defendant’s privilege under state law or the Compulsory
Process Clause [unfairly] shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows from the State to the
accused.” Id. Nevertheless, states remain “free to adopt procedural rules governing” a defendant’s
exercise of his confrontation right. Id. at 2541. Although the Court declined to establish a
taxonomy of acceptable and unacceptable rules, see id. at 2541 n.12, it did address two common
procedural schemes. Notice-and-demand statutes that merely “require the prosecution to provide
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In short, the majority dismisses the dissent’s assumptions, and its
projections, as “wildly unrealistic.”156 It also brushes aside the dissent’s
expansive reading of its holding, assuring the reader that “we do not
hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant
in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or
accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the
prosecution’s case.” 157 “‘[G]aps in the chain [of custody] normally go to
the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility,’” and it remains
“up to the prosecution to decide what steps . . . are so crucial as to
require evidence.” 158 Further, maintenance and calibration records “may
well qualify as nontestimonial.”159 The majority closes with a confident
pronouncement: “there is little reason to believe that our decision today
will commence the parade of horribles respondent and the dissent
predict.” 160
3. The Reality
On one hand, the majority’s assurances underestimate the inevitable
consequences of Melendez-Diaz. Given the enormous number of drug
trials that occur in the United States each year, prosecutors almost
certainly rely on drug certificates in hundreds, if not thousands, of cases.
This number balloons when one considers that prosecutors may offer
other forensic evidence, such as latent fingerprint or ballistics analyses,
through sworn certificates. Defendants may sometimes stipulate to test

notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial, after which the
defendant is given a period of time in which he may” demand the analyst’s live testimony, are
constitutional. Id. at 2541 & n.12. Statutes that require the defendant himself to subpoena the
analyst are not. See id. at 2540. The Court granted certiorari in a case raising the constitutionality
of such a statute only four days after issuing its decision in Melendez-Diaz. See Magruder v.
Virginia, 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008), cert. granted sub. nom. Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct. 2858
(2009). After full briefing and oral argument, however, the Court issued a terse per curiam opinion
vacating and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz. See Briscoe v.
Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316, 1316 (2010).
Before Melendez-Diaz, states’ procedural rules governing confrontation of forensic
analysts varied widely.
For an authoritative survey explaining why most are facially
unconstitutional under Crawford, see Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 475 (2006). Cf. Jennifer B. Sokoler, Note, Between Substance and Procedure: A Role for
States’ Interests in the Scope of the Confrontation Clause, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 161 (2010)
(proposing a framework for assessing the constitutionality of states’ procedural rules postMelendez-Diaz that balances the defendant’s right to confrontation with states’ interests).
156. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 n.10.
157. Id. at 2532 n.1.
158. Id. (quoting United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988)).
159. See id.
160. Id. at 2542.
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results or decline to exercise their confrontation rights, and in some
states, Melendez-Diaz will not require a change in practice. Still, the
decision will surely result in a sizable increase in court appearances by
forensic analysts, simply because prosecutors use forensic analyses so
frequently. 161 Moreover, the Court may not have held that the
prosecution must call everyone whose testimony may be relevant to
authentication or identification, but “what testimony is introduced must
(if the defendant objects) be introduced live.”162 Existing practice in
many jurisdictions may not conform to this standard.
Yet on the other hand, the outlook is not so bleak as the dissent
would have us believe. The dissent overlooks—and the majority does
not discuss—a fundamental limitation on the reach of Melendez-Diaz:
like the Confrontation Clause, it applies only to testimonial hearsay. 163
Melendez-Diaz matters only when the prosecution offers a forensic
analyst’s testimonial statement into evidence for its truth. While all
sworn drug certificates are necessarily testimonial under Melendez-Diaz,
forensic analysts produce, and prosecutors introduce, many other forms
of documentary evidence embodying and supporting forensic analyses,
some of which may not be testimonial. Moreover, when one forensic
analyst’s work product emerges in the courtroom only as part of the
factual basis for a testifying expert’s opinion, Melendez-Diaz may not
apply. Unpacking each of these considerations will provide a more
nuanced picture of the costs Melendez-Diaz will impose on the criminal
justice system.
a. Testimonial Statements under Melendez-Diaz
Although the Court’s conclusion in Melendez-Diaz relies on
Crawford, the term “testimonial” carries different meanings in the two
decisions. 164 In light of Justice Thomas’s concurrence, only formal
Even thus
statements are testimonial under Melendez-Diaz. 165
circumscribed, the decision may affect many categories of forensic
evidence. I discuss three of them here: forensic analysts’ unsworn

161. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 86 (2009) [hereinafter, NRC REPORT] (“Forensic science
experts and evidence are routinely used in the service of the criminal justice system.”).
162. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1.
163. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-24 (2006).
164. See supra Part II.D.
165. See id.
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reports, equipment calibration and maintenance records, and chain-ofcustody documents.
b. Forensic Analysts’ Unsworn Reports
Prosecutors increasingly rely on a wide array166 of forensic
disciplines to sway jurors conditioned by the media to expect forensic
evidence. 167 In a given case, a prosecutor may offer live testimony
describing a forensic analysis and its conclusions, a forensic analyst’s
report, or both. Melendez-Diaz potentially comes into play only when
live testimony is omitted altogether, or when the live witness is not the
report’s author. Under Melendez-Diaz, a report is testimonial if it is, in
effect if not in name, a sworn affidavit; but some unsworn reports might
conceivably satisfy Justice Thomas’s formality requirement. 168
To meet that criterion, unsworn reports must resemble “formalized
testimonial materials” such as affidavits, depositions, and prior
testimony, or bear “indicia of formality” akin to the ritual of informing a
suspect of his Miranda rights. 169 Justice Thomas categorizes affidavits
and depositions as testimonial because they “are, by their very nature,
taken through a formalized process.”170 He has not specifically
identified what makes the process “formalized” in his view, but logic
suggests two possibilities. Depositions, for example, are structured in
that they follow specific, established procedures, but deponents also
swear an oath at the outset, conferring a degree of solemnity to the
proceedings. Regardless of which characteristic Justice Thomas has in
mind, they both convey to the deponent the gravity of the occasion and
the importance of speaking truthfully, just as administering Miranda
warnings puts a suspect on notice that serious consequences may follow
from his subsequent statements. For Justice Thomas, a formalized
statement seems to be one made under circumstances that prompt the

166. See generally NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 127-72 (describing some of the “major”
forensic disciplines).
167. See infra note 340.
168. At least one commentator has reasoned that Justice Thomas would have joined the
majority in Melendez-Diaz even had the drug certificate not included a formal oath. See Bennett L.
Gershman, Confronting Scientific Reports Under Crawford v. Washington, 29 PACE L. REV. 479,
495 (2009). Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 n.3 (2004) (“We find it implausible that a
provision which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought trial by unsworn
ex parte affidavit perfectly OK.”).
169. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
170. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 836-37 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
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speaker to soberly consider his words and that incentivize him to tell the
truth.
When might an unsworn report fit the bill? Suppose, for example,
that a forensic laboratory requires its analysts to write reports using
standardized forms and assigns supervisors to review the reports for
accuracy and completeness. The use of forms would constrain the
content of analysts’ statements, pressing them to construct answers to
specific questions (as at a deposition), and the review procedures would
encourage rigor and thoroughness. Unsworn forensic reports produced
according to these or similar procedures might qualify as formalized
testimonial materials.
One lower-court decision applying Melendez-Diaz suggests two
further limitations. In People v. Brown, the New York Court of Appeals
concluded that a private laboratory’s unsworn report—consisting of
“machine-generated raw data, graphs and charts” reflecting the DNA
characteristics of a male specimen extracted from a rape kit—was nontestimonial. 171 Two of the court’s rationales for this conclusion
highlight the limits of Melendez-Diaz.
First, the report consisted only of machine-generated information,
not subjective conclusions or analyses.172 As several courts have held,
machines cannot testify, and machine-generated data do not constitute
the testimonial statements of the machine’s operator. 173 The laboratory
technicians in Brown undoubtedly took actions, such as preparing
samples and triggering chemical reactions, that affected the ultimate
report, but they did not make statements. And only statements implicate

171. 918 N.E.2d 927, 928-33 (N.Y. 2009).
172. Id. at 931-32. The prosecution called, and Brown was able to cross-examine, the forensic
biologist who actually analyzed the raw data in the lab report, compared it to Brown’s DNA profile,
and concluded that the two likely shared the same origin. See id. at 931.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Confrontation
Clause does not forbid the use of raw data produced by scientific instruments, though the
interpretation of those data may be testimonial.”); United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230
(4th Cir. 2007) (“The raw data generated by the diagnostic machines are the ‘statements’ of the
machines themselves, not their operators.”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2856 (2009). But cf. State v.
Bullcoming 226 P.3d 1, 4-6, 9 (N.M. 2010) (holding that a laboratory report including, inter alia,
unsworn certifications and the results of blood-alcohol measurements conducted with a gas
chromatograph, was testimonial because it was formalized, had been made for the purpose of
proving past facts, and had been offered to prove an essential element of the prosecution’s case, but
deeming the technician who wrote the report “a mere scrivener” of output from the gas
chromatograph machine, which was “Defendant’s true ‘accuser’”).
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the Confrontation Clause.174 Where unsworn forensic reports consist
wholly of machine-generated data, Melendez-Diaz will not apply.
Second, the laboratory that generated the report in Brown was
independent of law enforcement. 175 Unlike government-operated labs,
commercial laboratories analyze samples for a variety of clients, such as
individuals seeking to confirm paternity or to ascertain whether they
share genetic markers for hereditary diseases. 176 Thus, when an analyst
prepares his report, he may not know the client’s identity or motive for
requesting the test. In contrast, many public crime laboratories perform
forensic analyses primarily (or solely) to facilitate the identification and
prosecution of criminals. Thus, whereas an objective state crime lab
employee “‘would reasonably . . . believe that [his report] would be
available for use at a later trial,’” 177 the same cannot necessarily be said
of analysts at private labs. As a result, their reports may often be
nontestimonial. 178
Along with Justice Thomas’s concurrence, these distinctions
between public and private laboratories, and between human
observations and machine-generated data, may place many unsworn
forensic reports outside the scope of Melendez-Diaz.
c. Equipment Calibration & Maintenance Records
When a prosecutor relies on measurements or tests to make his
case, he may wish to demonstrate their reliability—or to refute the
defendant’s charges of inaccuracy—by showing that the equipment used
to conduct them had been properly maintained and calibrated. Rather
than locate and subpoena the maintenance technician, however, the
prosecutor might simply introduce written records. After MelendezDiaz, are such records testimonial? In dicta, the Melendez-Diaz Court
declared that “it is not the case[] that anyone whose testimony may be
relevant in establishing . . . the accuracy of the testing device[] must
appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case,” and that “documents
prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may well

174. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 (explaining that the Clause is concerned only with testimonial
hearsay); FED. R. EVID. 801 (defining hearsay as out-of-court statements offered for the truth of
what they assert).
175. Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 932.
176. See Fenner, supra note 114, at 62.
177. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (quoting Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004).
178. This rationale applies equally to calibration and maintenance records for private
laboratories’ equipment.

STEVENS_CONLAW_2010-2011.DOC

114

AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY

6/2/2011 1:50 PM

[2:81

qualify as nontestimonial records.” 179 The Court ultimately left the
question open, however, and lower courts have now begun to wrestle
with it.
The vast majority of courts considering this issue have found
maintenance and calibration records to be nontestimonial. 180 Some have
read the dicta quoted in the previous paragraph as carving out an
exception for these records. 181 Others have reasoned that such records
contain only “neutral” information used to prove “collateral facts” that
are outside the Sixth Amendment, that calibration records “do not
pertain to any particular defendant or specific case,” and that calibrating
technicians “do not know which certificates, if any, will be used in
litigation.” 182
Two New York trial courts have held that breathalyzer maintenance
and calibration records are testimonial.183 In these cases, because the
challenged records took the form of sworn certificates, and because they
had been “made under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe [they] would be available for use later at
trial,” the courts found them indistinguishable, for constitutional
purposes, from the affidavit in Melendez-Diaz. 184 In People v. Carreira,
the court acknowledged its minority position but could not escape the
conclusion that the calibration records had been “prepared expressly for
use in litigation.” 185 That calibration and maintenance records prove
only collateral facts was irrelevant because Crawford does not
“discriminate between . . . direct and indirect evidence.”186 And given
that law enforcement personnel create the records for use by other law
enforcement personnel, they could hardly be characterized as

179. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Bacas, 662 F. Supp. 2d 481, 484-86 (E.D. Va. 2009) (tuning
forks); United States v. Forstell, 656 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580-81 (E.D. Va. 2009) (radar gun, tuning
forks, and Intoxilyzer); State v. Fitzwater, 227 P.3d 520, 540 (Haw. 2010) (speedometer); People v.
DiBari, 26 Misc. 3d 1220(A), 2010 WL 432361, at *4 (N.Y. Just. Ct. Feb. 8, 2010) (Intoxilyzer);
People v. Harvey, 26 Misc. 3d 1218(A), 2010 WL 376935, at *3 (N.Y. Just. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010);
People v. Kelly, 26 Misc.3d 1205(A), 2009 WL 5183779, at *4 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Dec. 22, 2009)
(Intoxilyzer); State v. Bergin, 217 P.3d 1087, 1088-90 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (Intoxilyzer).
181. See, e.g., Forstell, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 581; Fitzwater, 227 P.3d at 540; DiBari, 2010 WL
432361, at *3.
182. Bacas, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 485; accord Bergin, 217 P.3d at 1089-90 (also noting that
challenged Intoxilyzer calibration certificate was unsworn).
183. People v. Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846-47 (City Ct. 2010) (Intoxilyzer); People v.
Heyanka, 886 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (Dist. Ct. 2009) (Intoxilyzer).
184. See Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d at 846; Heyanka, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
185. See 893 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
186. Id. at 848.
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“neutral.” 187
Indeed, state law mandated breathalyzer machine
certification “precisely because evidence produced using them will end
up in court (most likely criminal court) and the People want to ensure
their accuracy for prosecutorial purposes.”188 “But for the need to prove
DWI in court, these procedures and records would not exist.” 189
Test result admissibility is the raison d’être of breathalyzer
calibration records, but Carreira’s analysis fails to account for a
distinctive feature of these records, and one on which some courts have
relied, post-Melendez-Diaz, in holding them nontestimonial. 190 That is,
breathalyzer calibration records are created for a general prosecutorial
purpose, but not for the prosecution of any particular offense or
defendant. 191 Both Crawford and Melendez-Diaz speak broadly of
affidavits and of statements “made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe” they “would be
available for use at a later trial.”192 Neither opinion, on its face, suggests
that an affidavit is nontestimonial unless sworn out in a specific case, or
that the objective witness must anticipate a statement’s use in a
particular trial for it to be testimonial. Thus, to rely on this distinction to
exempt breathalyzer calibration records from the Confrontation Clause,
one must read a proviso into Crawford. 193
Such a proviso might well square with the text of the Confrontation
Clause. The Clause guarantees a defendant’s right “to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.” 194 The phrase “witnesses against him”
could refer to all whose statements are used against the defendant at
trial, or it could refer to those who bore testimony against him—this
defendant. In the latter case, breathalyzer calibration records would fall
outside the Clause. For example, consider a calibration record,
introduced at trial against DWI defendant Dan, and created by technician

187. See id.
188. Id. at 847.
189. Id. at 848.
190. See supra note 182.
191. This argument had gained currency before Melendez-Diaz, when courts almost uniformly
concluded that breathalyzer calibration records are nontestimonial. See Mnookin, supra note 19 at
846-48.
192. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531-32 (2009); Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004).
193. Before Melendez-Diaz, at least one commentator proposed that Crawford should be
modified in this fashion. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 849. Cf. Fenner, supra note 114, at 75
(examining “whether the Confrontation Clause’s primary-purpose test requires a primary purpose
related to a particular crime, series of crimes, or criminal enterprise” in the context of forensic
reports).
194. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Tom months before Dan’s offense. Tom’s statements have been used
against Dan, but when he made them, Tom was not, in any ordinary
sense of the words, a “witness against” Dan. 195
For now, however, Melendez-Diaz is the law of the land. While
many courts have placed great stock in that decision’s dicta, the Court
stopped short of saying that equipment calibration and maintenance
records are nontestimonial. It may not “be the case[] that anyone whose
testimony may be relevant in establishing the . . . accuracy of the testing
device must” testify, but “what testimony is introduced must . . . be
introduced live.” 196 Stated differently, nothing obliges a prosecutor to
establish a testing device’s accuracy, but if he does so, using testimony,
that testimony must be live. And whatever the Melendez-Diaz Court
may have said in dicta, its holding compels the conclusion that—at least
with respect to breathalyzers and their ilk—maintenance and calibration
records constitute testimony.
d. Chain of Custody
Under most jurisdictions’ rules, the proponent of physical or
documentary evidence must offer supporting evidence sufficient to
sustain a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it to be.197
To the extent that prosecutors have in the past met this burden through
sworn certifications, they must now present live testimony. 198
For example, before Melendez-Diaz, a prosecutor might have
introduced a handgun found at a crime scene through the testimony of
the investigating officer who initially seized the gun, or through that of
the ballistics expert who ultimately performed tests on it. Even
assuming that both of these end-point witnesses testify, various law
enforcement personnel will likely have handled the weapon in the
interim. To prove that the tested gun was the same gun seized at the
crime scene, the prosecutor might introduce a chain-of-custody form,
signed or initialed by the intermediate handlers, and recording the dates
and times of each transfer among them. This form might also

195. Of course, “him” should not be construed too literally. As Mnookin suggests, a statement
made for the purpose of “investigating a specific criminal act” before police have identified a
suspect should not be treated differently from a statement offered to inculpate a particular
individual. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 849. In both instances, the witness should reasonably
anticipate that his statement will be used in a particular trial.
196. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1.
197. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
198. An exception to this rule may exist for certifications from public records custodians. See
supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text..
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incorporate preprinted language to the effect that, by signing, each
signatory affirms that he received and/or relinquished custody of the
specified item at the dates and times provided, and that he possessed the
item continuously and without altering it during the intervening period.
The prosecutor could thus present an unbroken chain of custody to the
jury. But, thanks to the preprinted language, this chain-of-custody form
looks an awful lot like an affidavit, and post-Melendez-Diaz, the
prosecutor cannot introduce it unless the defendant has an opportunity to
cross-examine each and every signatory.
Removing the preprinted language might not change the outcome.
A law enforcement officer who signs a chain-of-custody form would
reasonably expect the document to later be used in a criminal
prosecution. Such forms exist principally due to the requirement that
trial evidence be authenticated. And depending on the nature of the
form and the circumstances surrounding its completion—if, for example,
officers receive extensive training on the forms and their purpose and
know that supervisors and prosecutors will review the forms to ensure
that all periods of time are properly accounted for—even Justice Thomas
might agree that removal of the oath would not render the document
non-testimonial. 199
Melendez-Diaz thus forces prosecutors to confront a new dilemma
in establishing chain of custody. While the threshold for admission—
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item passed from crime
scene to courtroom without alteration200—is low, the threshold of juror
persuasion may be higher. Yet, coordinating with additional witnesses
will burden the prosecutor, and their testimony will consume more of the
court’s and jurors’ time. Prosecutors must carefully weigh these
conflicting incentives when deciding “what steps in the chain of custody
are so crucial as to require evidence.” 201
At first blush, the effects of implementing this rule appear
sweeping, but they will likely prove minimal. Law enforcement can
adapt by eliminating unnecessary intermediate links in the chain of
custody. And in the courtroom, excluding standardized forms that
exhaustively establish the chain will not necessarily lead jurors to
systematically doubt the provenance of evidence. Prosecutors may

199. See supra pp. 34-35.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Mendel, 746 F.2d 155, 167 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting United
States v. Howard-Arias, 629 F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1982) (“The ultimate question is whether the
authentication testimony is sufficiently complete so as to convince the court of the improbability
that the original item had been exchanged with another or otherwise tampered with.”).
201. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1.
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choose to present one or two additional live witnesses where the chain of
custody is particularly attenuated, or to rebut allegations of evidence
tampering. In most cases, however, experts and fact witnesses whom the
prosecution would have called anyway will establish the chain with
sufficient completeness to satisfy jurors. 202
e. Evidence Used “Not For its Truth”
Crawford confirms that the Confrontation Clause “does not bar the
use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the
truth of the matter asserted,” 203 and Melendez-Diaz does not purport to
alter that rule. Thus, Melendez-Diaz does not preclude a forensic
report’s admission if the prosecution offers it for a non-hearsay purpose,
such as illustrating the factual basis for a testifying expert’s opinion.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert witness may rely
on otherwise inadmissible evidence in forming the opinion to which he
will testify, so long as that evidence is of the sort on which experts in his
field typically rest their professional judgments. 204 Most states have
adopted similar rules. 205 But may the expert then disclose the basis for
his opinion on the stand, even if that information would otherwise be
excluded? On one hand, disclosure enables jurors to evaluate the
expert’s reasoning and thereby assists them in determining how much
credibility and weight to give the expert’s opinion.206 Yet on the other
hand, putting evidence before the jury for this supposedly limited
purpose poses the risk that jurors will use that evidence for its truth, as
well. Indeed, jurors must evaluate an expert’s sources in order to
202. The dissent contends that under the Court’s holding, when a defendant “challenges the
procedures for a secure chain of custody,” the prosecution must call, in its case-in-chief, “each
person who is in the chain of custody—and who had an undoubted opportunity to taint or tamper
with the evidence.” Id. at 2549 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This contention thoroughly misconstrues
the Court’s holding. As a baseline, prosecutors must satisfy the standard for admissibility, but the
rules of evidence, not Melendez-Diaz, dictate this requirement. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a). Beyond
that low threshold, whether to establish the chain of custody in greater detail is within a prosecutor’s
discretion. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1. If the defendant alleges that evidence was
contaminated or tampered with, the prosecutor can choose to rebut those allegations, but MelendezDiaz does not require that he do so. Instead, Melendez-Diaz simply restricts the means by which
prosecutors can prove chain-of-custody, both in meeting the standard for admissibility and in
establishing the chain with greater certainty: unless Crawford’s requirements are met, they cannot
use testimonial hearsay. See id. Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the decision does not “control[]
who[m] the prosecution must call,” but rather, how it may present their testimony. See id. at 2549
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
203. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004).
204. See FED. R. EVID. 703 & advisory committee’s note.
205. Mnookin, supra note 19, at 802.
206. Id.
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rationally evaluate his reasoning, and doing so “will inevitably involve a
judgment about the likelihood that the sources themselves are valid and
worthy of reliance.” 207 In light of these competing considerations,
evidence rules subject disclosure to a balancing test. In federal court and
a few states, the probative value of disclosure must substantially
outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.208 In most states,
however, the rules strongly favor disclosure, allowing it unless the risk
substantially outweighs the reward. 209
After Crawford, some courts held that when another witness’s
testimonial statements form the factual basis of an expert’s opinion, the
Confrontation Clause prohibits those statements’ disclosure to the
jury. 210 Other courts, however, allowed expert witnesses to disclose
others’ forensic analyses on the stand and even admitted absent analysts’
reports on the theory that, even if this evidence was testimonial, it was
not hearsay. 211
This split of authority persists post-Melendez-Diaz. Courts in
Illinois and Indiana have upheld “surrogate” expert testimony regarding
the content of forensic reports under the not-for-its-truth rationale. 212
But other courts have held that the Confrontation Clause forbids the
admission of one forensic analyst’s testimonial statements through the
in-court testimony of another. 213 Still other courts have taken a more
nuanced approach, differentiating between an expert who merely parrots

207. Id. at 816.
208. See FED. R. EVID. 703; Mnookin, supra note 19, at 804.
209. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 804.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 198-99 (2d Cir. 2008); Roberts v. United
States, 916 A.2d 922, 937-39 (D.C. 2007); People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732-34 (N.Y.
2005).
211. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 160 P.3d 177, 193-94 (Ariz. 2007); State v. Delaney, 613 S.E.2d
699, 700-01 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Barton, 709 N.W.2d 93, 95-98 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005).
212. See, e.g., People v. Lovejoy, 919 N.E.2d 843, 867-70 (Ill. 2009); Pendergrass v. State, 889
N.E.2d 861, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that admission of absent forensic analyst’s reports
did not violate defendant’s confrontation right because reports were not admitted for their truth, but
to provide context for testifying expert’s opinion), vacated by, 913 N.E.2d 703, 707-09 (Ind. 2009)
(holding that admission of absent forensic analysts’ reports did not violate defendant’s confrontation
right because opportunity to cross-examine non-authoring experts satisfied the right, adding that
reports were not hearsay because they were admitted as sources on which expert relied), cert.
denied, 2010 WL 197668 (2010). See also People v. Barba, No. B185940, 2010 WL 571950, at *910 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2010); People v. Rutterschmidt, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 410-13 (Ct. App.
2009), review granted and. superseded by, 220 P.3d 239 (Cal. 2009).
213. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1027-29 (Mass. 2009); Wood v.
State, 299 S.W.3d 200, 207-14 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009). See also Steven N. Yermish, Melendez-Diaz
and the Application of Crawford in the Lab, CHAMPION, Aug. 2009, at 28, 31 (asserting that
“Melendez-Diaz confirms the position that an expert cannot testify about lab test reports without
confrontation of the person who did the underlying analysis”).
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another’s opinions and one who cites others’ factual findings to support
his own conclusions. 214 These analyses lack uniformity, but they
illustrate a broader point: even after Melendez-Diaz, some prosecutors
can still put non-testifying forensic analysts’ work product before the
jury, albeit ostensibly for a limited, non-hearsay purpose.
This practice plainly conforms to the letter of Crawford, but
whether it comports with the spirit of that decision is another matter
altogether.
Crawford sought to uncouple Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence from the rules of evidence. 215 In overturning the rule that
statements falling within “firmly-rooted” hearsay exceptions were
exempt from confrontation, the Court declared that “[w]here testimonial
statements are involved,” the Framers did not “mean[] to leave the Sixth
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence.” 216
Yet it is the rules of evidence that allow admission of testimonial
statements through expert witnesses under the fiction that jurors will not
consider them for their truth. Knowledge of the facts on which an expert
based his opinion enables jurors to better assess the expert’s testimony,
but it does so only by allowing them to judge whether the expert relied
on sound sources. 217 “To make rational use of this evidence, a factfinder
must first assess the likelihood that it is worth relying upon” 218—i.e.,
whether it is true. And once jurors have considered the truth of factualbasis evidence, it strains credulity to suggest that they will simply ignore
that evidence when addressing the substantive question of guilt or
innocence.
In short, the “not-for-its-truth” rationale is an intellectually
disingenuous means to circumvent Crawford, and I do not discuss it here
in order to advocate its adoption. Unless and until the Supreme Court
closes this loophole, however, courts will remain free to admit
testimonial forensic analyses through expert witness testimony, and this

214. See, e.g., Rector v. State, 681 S.E.2d 157, 160 (Ga. 2009); State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d
293, 304-05 (N.C. 2009); State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948, 950-52, 955-58 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). See
generally Vann v. State, 229 P.3d 197 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (collecting cases and thoroughly
analyzing whether this “conduit limitation” serves the purposes of the Confrontation Clause).
215. Pendergrass v. Indiana, No. 09-866, 2010 WL 271330, at *30 (Jan. 19, 2010) (denying
certiorari); see also People v. Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 713 n.14 (Ct. App. 2009) (“Where
testimonial hearsay is involved, the Confrontation Clause trumps the rules of evidence.”), rev.
granted and superseded by, 220 P.3d 240 (Cal. 2009).
216. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
217. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 816.
218. Id.; accord Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional
Boundaries of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 828, 855-56 (2008) (“[I]t is not logically
possible for a jury to use [factual-basis evidence] to assess the weight of the expert’s opinion other
than by considering [its] truth.”).
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practice may operate as a significant check on the practical costs of
Melendez-Diaz.
*
*
*
*
*
What does this analysis tell us about those costs? First, Justice
Thomas’s “formality” requirement will limit the decision’s applicability
to unsworn forensic reports. Second, to the extent that reports consist of
machine-generated, raw data, they will likely be unaffected, and the
same goes for unsworn reports prepared by private, commercial
laboratories. Third, breathalyzer calibration records fall squarely within
Melendez-Diaz’s holding, but relying on dicta in the majority opinion,
most courts have concluded otherwise. Fourth, much chain-of-custody
evidence should likewise qualify as testimonial under Melendez-Diaz,
though in practice this may result only in the exclusion of some
standardized chain-of-custody forms. And finally, because the decision
applies only to hearsay, it does not foreclose the admission of nontestifying analysts’ work product as the factual basis for a testifying
expert’s opinion.
In sum, Melendez-Diaz has the potential to affect a tremendous
number of criminal cases, but mostly at the margins. Drug cases aside,
anecdotal evidence suggests that prosecutors rarely rely on hearsay alone
to prove an essential element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Forensic analysts’ reports frequently supplement other evidence, so their
exclusion would harm, but not hamstring, the prosecution’s case.
Similarly, if prosecutors cannot prove every link in the chain of custody
for real evidence, jurors will not automatically doubt the items’
authenticity. And in terms of its persuasive effect on jurors, admission
of an analyst’s report as factual-basis evidence, and not for its truth, will
likely prove a distinction without a difference.
Still, Melendez-Diaz surely means that more forensic analysts must
take the witness stand. Even when the substance of an analyst’s report is
essentially uncontested—as in a drug case, where the defense is not that
the drugs aren’t drugs—defendants will likely demand confrontation
because doing so presents no drawbacks. The prosecution must secure
the analyst’s attendance and conduct a lengthy direct examination that
may bore or annoy the jury. Defense counsel need only prepare for a
perfunctory cross-examination while hoping for a mistrial or a directed
verdict should the analyst fail to appear. Defense attorneys who
consistently engage in such gamesmanship may irritate judges with busy
calendars (not to mention the prosecutors they face), but judges can
hardly fault the defendants for exercising their constitutional rights.
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When a defendant demands confrontation of a forensic analyst, this
should rarely prove to be a showstopper. 219 The dissent’s fear that
forensic analysts will often prove unable to “make it to the courthouse in
time” 220 is simply unwarranted. Analysts may, on occasion, fall ill, have
personal or professional commitments that conflict with trial, or “be
unable to travel because of inclement weather.”221 But the same can be
said of all other prosecution witnesses. Forensic analysts—many of
whom are public employees—will likely prove more reliable, and easier
for prosecutors to communicate with, than lay witnesses. And while
calling analysts to testify in court may draw them away from important
public duties, and although they may occasionally be called to testify in
more than one case on the same day, the same can be said of police
officers. Police officers manage to balance their investigatory duties
with regular court appearances. Forensic analysts can—and will—learn
do the same.
B.

Benefits

Implementing Melendez-Diaz will impose costs on government and
the legal system, but ensuring that defendants consistently have the
opportunity to cross-examine forensic analysts will yield countervailing
benefits. The Melendez-Diaz dissent’s contrary assertion rests on
several false premises, and the majority’s brief riposte merely hints at
the potential value of testing forensic analyses “in the crucible of cross-

219. In a very few cases, forensic analysts will be genuinely unavailable. Suppose, for
example, that a medical examiner conducts an autopsy on a murder victim but dies long before
police identify a suspect. See Mnookin, supra note 19, at 851. Under Melendez-Diaz, the
examiner’s report may well be testimonial, and a new autopsy is, of course, impossible. See id. at
851-52 (arguing that in such a scenario, the autopsy results are testimonial under Crawford and
must be entirely excluded, thereby unfairly rewarding the suspect for evading capture for so long);
Carolyn Zabrycki, Comment, Toward a Definition of “Testimonial”: How Autopsy Reports Do Not
Embody the Qualities of a Testimonial Statement, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1093, 1115 (2008) (arguing
that a rule under which autopsy reports are testimonial would “effectively function[] as a statute of
limitations for murder”).
Yet if the original examiner videotaped the autopsy process or took extensive photographs
and measurements, a second medical examiner could review these materials as well as the deceased
examiner’s report. It seems plausible that photographs of bruise patterns, raw data from a
toxicology screening, or other nontestimonial documentation could enable the second examiner to
form entirely independent opinions. Leaving aside the not-for-its-truth rationale for admission of
the first examiner’s report, the second examiner could convey his opinion (and perhaps some of its
factual basis) without disclosing any testimonial statements. Even in this extreme hypothetical,
Melendez-Diaz does not definitively foreclose the admission of crucial forensic evidence.
220. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2550 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
221. See id.
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examination.” 222 Confrontation’s fundamental purpose is “to ensure
reliability of evidence,” 223 which in turn serves the truth-seeking
function of criminal trials. Hence, to measure the potential benefits of
Melendez-Diaz, one must consider whether, and how, cross-examination
of forensic analysts will aid jurors in evaluating the reliability of forensic
evidence. In this section, I aim to answer those questions, framing my
analysis as a response to four of the Melendez-Diaz dissent’s arguments.
1. Cross-examination can expose errors in forensic conclusions
and flaws in the underlying forensic method.
The dissent argues that cross-examination of forensic analysts will
prove valueless because it will not “detect errors in scientific tests”; and
that the defense should instead conduct a new test, or where a new test is
impossible, call its own expert. 224 As an initial matter, these proposed
alternatives reflect wishful thinking. “Some forensic analyses, such as
autopsies and breathalyzer tests, cannot be repeated, and the specimens
used for other analyses have often been lost or degraded.”225 And it is
hardly plausible that courts will approve funding for indigent defendants
to re-test a sample or retain an expert in every case in which the
prosecution offers forensic evidence. Indeed, the cost of doing so might
well exceed the cost of securing live testimony from the analyst who
conducted the original test.
More fundamentally, the dissent’s contention that crossexamination cannot undermine the substance of forensic analyses is flatout wrong. As the majority acknowledges, recent exoneration statistics
demonstrate that “invalid forensic testimony” is a genuine, systemic
problem 226—one that inquiry into forensic analysts’ methodologies may
ameliorate.227 Defense counsel might explore, and the jury might benefit
from hearing, how very little science lies behind most “forensic

222. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
223. Id.
224. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2547 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 2536 n.5.
226. See id. at 2537.
227. See, e.g., id. at 2537 (noting that many forensic methodologies, including those followed
by the laboratory analysts in Melendez-Diaz, “require[] the exercise of judgment and present[] a risk
of error that might be explored on cross-examination”); Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 202,
210 (2009) (arguing that “the defendant has an interest in cross-examining a technician not just on
the conduct of a particular test but on the methodology in general”); Burke, supra note 1, at 16
(noting “the defendant’s interest in cross-examining a technician not just on implementation of one
particular test, but rather on the methodology employed generally”).
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sciences.” 228 DNA analysis represents the gold standard among forensic
disciplines. Its courtroom application “is a fortuitous by-product” of
rigorous research by scientists in academic and commercial
laboratories. 229 Its ability to individuate—to reliably associate an
unknown sample to a particular person, to the exclusion of all others—
rests on theoretically and empirically sound biological explanations. 230
Its methodology minimizes “the chance of two different people
matching,” and its error rates have been explored and documented. 231
“[T]he laboratory procedures are well specified,” and “there are clear
and repeatable standards for analysis.” 232 In sum, DNA analysis is
scientific. It is objective, it rests on a validated methodology, empirical
tests have measured its accuracy, and analysts follow regular protocols.
Few other forensic disciplines share these characteristics, and whatever
else they may be called, these disciplines cannot fairly be called
“sciences.” 233

228. “The law’s greatest dilemma in its heavy reliance on forensic science . . . concerns the
question of whether—and to what extent—there is science in any given ‘forensic science’
discipline.” See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 87, 107-08. For many forensic disciplines, the
answer would seem to be no. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Where the Rubber Meets the Road:
Thinking About Expert Evidence as Expert Testimony, 52 VILL. L. REV. 803, 808 (2007) (“Very
little, if any, of what is called ‘forensic science’ consists of the sort of open-ended basic research
that is classically the object of the philosophy of science.”); J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern,
Devil in a White Coat: the Temptation of Forensic Evidence in the Age of CSI, 41 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 503, 520 (2007) (“At its core . . . forensic testing does not have an image problem; it has a
science problem. . . . [I]f forensic analysis is unable to achieve and document levels of validity and
reliability, perhaps it should stop calling itself science.”). According to the NRC Report:
Although some of the techniques used by the forensic science disciplines—such as DNA
analysis, serology, forensic pathology, toxicology, chemical analysis, and digital and
multimedia forensics—are built on solid bases of theory and research, many other
techniques have been developed heuristically. That is, they are based on observation,
experience, and reasoning without an underlying scientific theory, experiments designed
to test the uncertainties and reliability of the method, or sufficient data that are collected
and analyzed scientifically.
NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 128.
229. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 133; Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal
Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721,
730-31, 749 (2007). Murphy cautions, however, that despite DNA’s general scientific robustness,
its forensic application “lack[s] commercial or research analogs.” Id. at 749.
230. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 133.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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a. Subjectivity
Many forensic disciplines—including analysis of latent
fingerprints, shoeprints, tire tracks, toolmarks, 234 and bitemarks—
involve pattern comparisons. But “[f]ew, if any, . . . have objective
standards for deciding whether two patterns match. That determination
is left to the judgment of each examiner.” 235 Fingerprint analysis, for
example, entails visual comparison of an unknown print associated with
a crime to the known print of a particular suspect or to a print retrieved
from a database. 236 A “match” reflects the individual examiner’s
conclusion, “based on his or her experience, that sufficient quantity and
quality of . . . detail is in agreement.” 237 There is no core set of
characteristics that must agree, and no minimum number of details that
must align, for an examiner to reach this conclusion. 238 Hence, one
examiner’s analysis may differ from that of his colleague—they may
reach entirely different conclusions, or the same conclusion for entirely
different reasons—and “experienced examiners do not necessarily agree
with even their own past conclusions when the examination is presented
in a different context some time later.” 239
One might reasonably assume that when a forensic analyst’s
conclusion rests on a subjective judgment, the prosecution will call that
same analyst to testify, and the defendant will have an opportunity to
cross-examine him. This assumption would be false. Before MelendezDiaz, statutes in various jurisdictions authorized prosecutors to introduce
forensic certificates, without any live testimony, to “prove the results of
DNA tests, microscopic hair analyses, fingerprint identifications,
coroners’ reports, ballistics tests, and a wide range of other tests
conducted by a crime laboratory.” 240 And even where prosecutors did
offer live testimony, some undoubtedly chose to present a courtroomsavvy expert rather than the public crime-lab employee who conducted
the analysis.

234. “Toolmarks” are impressions “generated when a hard object (tool) comes into contact
with a relatively softer object.” NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 150.
235. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science
Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 200 (2008).
236. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 138.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 139; Saks & Koehler, supra note 235, at 200.
239. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 139; see also Saks & Koehler, supra note 235, at 201
(describing the study).
240. Metzger, supra note 155, at 478.
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Melendez-Diaz forecloses the former avenue for introducing an
analyst’s testimony, and it ought to foreclose the latter as well.241 In
such cases, cross-examination of the original analyst will prove
invaluable, as neither a sheet of paper nor a surrogate can fully
illuminate the basis for another person’s subjective conclusion.
Moreover, cross-examination can reveal to the jury—who might well
have assumed otherwise—that the conclusion is subjective. This fact is
surely relevant to a rational factfinder’s assessment of the conclusion’s
reliability and weight.
b. Validity
Methodological validity is a threshold question for scientific
disciplines. At a very basic level, does the method actually work? Is it
feasible to answer this question about this initial data by following this
process? Scientists confirm a method’s validity for a particular purpose
through validation studies. 242 Such a study “begin[s] with a clear
hypothesis (e.g., ‘new method X can reliably associate biological
evidence with its source’)” and then tests it through an unbiased
experiment designed to produce data potentially supporting or refuting
the hypothesis. 243 Publication of such studies in peer-reviewed journals
then enables “experts in the field [to] review, question, and check the
repeatability of the results.” 244
For the vast majority of forensic-science disciplines,
methodological validity remains unverified.245 For example, while “it
seems plausible that a careful comparison of two [fingerprints] can
accurately discern whether or not they had a common source,” no
empirical study has demonstrated that fingerprint analysts’ methodology
can reliably associate prints from the same source.246 Furthermore, like
many other forensic-science methodologies, latent fingerprint analysis is

241. See supra Part III.A.3.b.
242. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 113.
243. See id.
244. Id. at 114.
245. Craig M. Cooley, The CSI Effect: Its Impact and Potential Concerns, 41 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 471, 497 (2007) [hereinafter, Cooley, CSI Effect] (“[F]orensic science is and has been
premised on almost no research for more than a century.”). When validation studies have been
conducted, some have discredited once-vaunted forensic disciplines, such as paraffin and gunshot
residue testing. See id. at 497-98. Proponents of both methodologies claimed they could reliably
determine whether a person had recently fired a gun. Id. at 497-98.
246. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 142-43. See also id. at 154, 158, 167, 172 (pointing
to an absence or dearth of validation studies in the fields of firearm, bitemark, and toolmark
analysis, microscopic hair analysis, and forensic document examination).
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premised on the idea that “no two sets of markings left by distinct
objects can be indistinguishably alike.” 247 Is this core uniqueness
principle true? Biological explanations exist for individual differences
in DNA, 248 but the same cannot be said of fingerprints, let alone
shoeprints. Personal experience cannot, by itself, prove the principle’s
validity. 249 Yet because most forensic-science disciplines have not
bothered to scrutinize it, scant empirical evidence supporting (or
refuting) the uniqueness hypothesis exists.250
In the latent fingerprint analysis field, “[s]ome scientific evidence
supports the presumption that [prints] are unique to each person and
persist unchanged throughout a lifetime.” 251 Even if that evidence were
conclusive, however, uniqueness and persistence would be insufficient
to validate fingerprint analysts’ methods.252
Uniqueness does not guarantee that prints from two different people
are always sufficiently different that they cannot be confused, or that two
impressions made by the same finger will also be sufficiently similar to
be discerned as coming from the same source. The impression left by a
given finger will differ every time, because of inevitable variations in
pressure, which change the degree of contact between each part of the
ridge structure and the impression medium.
None of these
variabilities—of features across a population of fingers or of repeated
impressions left by the same finger—has been characterized, quantified,
or compared. 253
That so many forensic disciplines rely on unvalidated methods does
not necessarily mean that forensic evidence is unreliable bunk, but a
rational fact-finder would surely take this information into account in
weighing forensic evidence. When the prosecution introduces a forensic
analyst’s conclusions or data, jurors will likely assume that the

247. See Saks & Koehler, supra note 235, at 209. Bitemark, handwriting, shoeprint, tiremark,
and other forms of pattern analysis likewise endeavor to match an imprint left at the scene to a
specific person or object. See id. at 206.
248. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 133.
249. See Saks & Koehler, supra note 235, at 212 (citing the famous “all swans are white”
hypothesis: regardless of how many white swans one encounters, the sighting of a single black swan
would disprove the hypothesis).
250. Id. at 210.
251. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 143-44.
252. See id. at 144.
253. Id. See also id. at 149 (noting absence of such population studies to support shoeprint and
tiremark analysis); id. at 154-55 (noting dearth of support for uniqueness presumption in firearms
and toolmark analysis); id. at 157-58 (describing flawed population study to support microscopic
hair analysis); id. at 174 (noting absence of thorough population study to establish the uniqueness of
bite marks).
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underlying method does what it claims to do; otherwise, why would the
judge admit it? 254 An opportunity to cross-examine the analyst will
enable defense counsel to challenge this assumption. Jurors may also be
surprised to learn, for example, that while latent fingerprint analysts
operate on the premise that no two individuals can leave identical prints,
they don’t know for sure and haven’t bothered to confirm their
assumption. Such knowledge—gained from cross-examination of a
fingerprint analyst—will aid jurors in deciding how much weight to give
that analyst’s conclusions.
c. Accuracy
All scientific methodologies are subject to various sources of
error. 255 Even when a method works, it will not produce accurate results
100 percent of the time. Thus, “[a] key task for . . . the analyst applying
a scientific method to conduct a particular analysis[] is to identify as
many sources of error as possible, to control or to eliminate as many as
possible, and to estimate the magnitude of remaining errors so that the
conclusions drawn . . . are valid.” 256 Some errors will necessarily
remain, and ascertaining a methodology’s error rate “requires rigorously
developed and conducted scientific studies.” 257 Scientists seek to
document error rates in order to account for them when stating
conclusions. 258
“Unlike most scientific communities, [however,] the forensic
science community does not openly” pursue detection and measurement
of error rates. 259 In theory, a methodology that seeks to individuate
evidence from an unknown source to a particular suspect can yield false
positives and false negatives. 260 Yet the error rates for many forensic

254. The existing rules governing admissibility of forensic evidence have failed to ensure that
only evidence supported by a valid methodology gets to the jury. See generally NRC REPORT,
supra note 161, at 85-110 (discussing existing legal regime and identifying systemic features that
have allowed preemptive judicial certification of forensic methodologies). See also Murphy, supra
note 229, at 755-74 (arguing that the criminal justice system is structurally incapable of
distinguishing reliable from unreliable forensic evidence).
255. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 116.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 122.
258. See id. at 116-18.
259. See Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate
Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 393 (2004) [hereinafter, Cooley, Reforming the Forensic
Science Community].
260. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 117-20.
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disciplines are unknown. 261 In the field of toolmark analysis, for
example, “no statistical foundation for estimation of error rates
exists.” 262 Analysts in forensic disciplines for which error rates have not
been studied often claim (implausibly) that their techniques are
infallible. 263 When error rates have been examined, results have varied.
For example, studies have determined that over 97% of paint samples
“could be differentiated based on microscopic examinations coupled
with solubility and microchemical testing.” 264 In contrast, a recent study
of microscopic hair analysis revealed a 12.5% false positive rate.265
Cross-examination of a forensic analyst concerning a method’s
error rate has an obvious value for the defense, and for the jury. A bare
certificate, or a black-and-white conclusion in a report admitted through
another witness, presents a façade of absolute certainty. In reality,
though, the analyst’s techniques will sometimes produce the wrong
answer, even when executed perfectly. How frequently that happens—
or, as is more likely, that the analyst has no idea how often it happens—
should logically enter into a rational juror’s assessment of the
conclusion’s reliability.
d. Regularity
Whether a forensic analyst’s conclusion derives from the
application of regularized protocols also bears on its reliability. Do
well-accepted standards and procedures exist such that each analyst
follows the same process, in the same way, every time? For some
forensic-science disciplines, such as controlled-substance analysis,
government-sponsored working groups have devised such standards. 266
Still, “[i]t is questionable whether all of the [recommended protocols]
. . . would be acceptable in a scientific sense, if one’s goal were to
identify and classify a completely unknown substance.” 267 Although
some tests or combinations thereof can reliably identify unknown

261. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 259, at 397; accord
DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 522.
262. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 154.
263. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 259, at 393.
264. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 170.
265. See id. at 160-61. That study subjected eighty pairs of hairs that FBI examiners had
“associated” through microscopic analysis to mitochondrial DNA testing. See id. Nine pairs had
originated from different sources. See id. at 161. Earlier studies had produced fewer false positives
but suffered from methodological and statistical flaws. See id. at 157-58.
266. See id. at 135-36.
267. Id. at 136.
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substances, the working group guidelines do not sufficiently explain
which tests should be used for which tasks. 268
For other disciplines, no overarching guidelines encourage
procedural regularity. A toolmark analysts’ professional group has
proposed a threshold for association of a particular tool with a particular
mark, but it has not identified the characteristics that examiners should
look for or the process they should follow in comparing the tool and
mark. 269 Similarly, although a bitemark examiners’ professional
organization has issued guidelines for reporting bitemark comparisons,
no standards exist “for the type, quality, and number of individual
characteristics required to indicate that a bite mark has reached a
threshold of evidentiary value.” 270
As with subjectivity, validity, and accuracy, whether an analyst’s
conclusion rests on regular procedures and standards regularly applied or
an ad hoc examination of the evidence would, and should, influence a
rational juror’s assessment of the conclusion’s reliability. Certificates
typically present an analyst’s conclusions without explaining how he
reached them, 271 and while a surrogate expert can describe how he
would have conducted an analysis, he may not know what the testing
analyst actually did. Cross-examination of the analyst, himself,
however, can elicit this valuable information for the jury.
2. Cross-examination can prompt forensic analysts to retract,
qualify or clarify their conclusions.
The dissent insists that cross-examination of forensic analysts will
prove a pointless formalism because “[i]t is not plausible that a
laboratory analyst will retract his or her prior conclusions on catching
sight of the defendant the result condemns.” 272 This may be true of an
honest analyst, the majority concedes, but “the same cannot be said of
the fraudulent analyst.” 273 Furthermore, while outright fraud may be a
relative rarity, confrontation may also combat two equally pernicious but
far more common forensic-science phenomena: overclaiming and nonstandardized, ambiguous terminology.

268. See id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 176.
271. See id. at 186 (“The norm is to have no description of the methods of procedures used
. . . .”).
272. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2548 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
273. See id. at 2536 (majority opinion).
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a. Fraud
Intentional fraud by forensic analysts is the exception, not the
rule, 274 but when it occurs, it unfailingly grabs headlines. 275 Dishonest
forensic analysts have reported results for tests they did not perform,
concealed exculpatory results, fabricated evidence, and given false
testimony. 276 Other commentators have documented these scandals at
length. 277 It suffices to state that forensic fraud has tainted hundreds of
cases and resulted in numerous wrongful convictions, 278 and that further
instances undoubtedly have yet to be uncovered.
The risk of fraud is perhaps the most compelling policy reason for
recognizing a right to confront forensic analysts. Cross-examination
aims to unmask the false witness, 279 and like any other witness, a
forensic analyst may lie in a pretrial statement. Experience and common
sense confirm that forensic analysts’ and laboratory technicians’ honesty
cannot simply be taken for granted. When an analyst commits fraud, a
defendant has little hope of exposing it if the analyst’s written report is
introduced either on its own or through another expert’s testimony. 280

274. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 45.
275. See, e.g., Mary Flood, HPD Crime Lab Case Goes to the Jury, $35 Million at Stake for
Wrongfully Convicted Man, HOUSTON CHRON., June 24, 2009, at B-3; Robert C. Herguth, Report
Slams 80s Police Lab, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 14, 2001, at 5; Jay Rey, Chemist Admits to Falsifying
Lab Report; Officials Discount Impact on Cases, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 28, 2009, at B1; Ben
Schmitt & Joe Swickard, Detroit: Troubled Crime Lab Shuttered; State Police Audit Results
‘Appalling,’ Wayne County Prosecutor Declares, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 26, 2008, at 1; Kelly
Thornton, Police Lab Accused of Sloppy Work, False Data, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 24,
1997, at A-1.
276. See Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 259, at 401.
277. Craig Cooley, for one, describes several notorious examples. See id. at 401-08.
278. For instance, West Virginia State Police lab analyst Fred Zain’s practice of falsifying
evidence threw more than 100 convictions into doubt, and at least ten of those convictions have
since been overturned. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 44. The Innocence Project has
catalogued dozens of wrongful convictions based on intentional and unintentional laboratory errors.
Innocence Project, Wrongful Convictions Involving Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science that
Were
Later
Overturned
through
DNA
Testing,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/DNA_Exonerations_Forensic_Science.pdf (last visited Aug.
11, 2010).
279. Indeed, Sir Walter Raleigh (unsuccessfully) sought to confront his accuser because
Raleigh believed he would recant his lies if compelled to face the one they condemned. See
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004).
280. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay declarants are subject to impeachment to
the same extent as live witnesses. See FED. R. EVID. 806. The common impeachment techniques,
however, all require that the defendant know of specific statements or conduct by the analyst that
reflect poorly on the analyst’s credibility, or that the analyst have a poor reputation for truthfulness.
See generally Fred Warren Bennett, How to Administer the “Big Hurt” in a Criminal Case: the
Life and Times of Federal Rule of Evidence 806, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135, 1141-63 (1995)
(analyzing and providing examples of how defense counsel might impeach a hearsay declarant
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But as with any other witness, an analyst may retreat from a deliberate
fabrication when forced—thanks to Melendez-Diaz—to defend it under
oath in the courtroom. 281
b. Overclaiming
With far greater frequency than outright fraud, forensic analysts
engage in overclaiming, exaggerating their conclusions’ probative
value. 282 Anecdotes abound. Although “no empirical data exist on the
frequency of hair characteristics,” one microscopic hair analyst testified
that “the particular reddish-yellow hue of [the defendant’s] hair and the
crime scene hair were found in ‘about 5 percent of the population.’” 283
And in a federal trial, a firearms examiner implausibly claimed that he
could match six spent shell casings to a gun recovered more than a year
later, “‘to the exclusion of every other firearm in the world.’”284
Baseless individualization claims like the latter one account for
many instances of overclaiming. 285 As explained above, in no forensicscience discipline other than DNA analysis has empirical research
confirmed the uniqueness proposition that underpins individualization

using each of nine traditional methods). Even if the defendant has somehow acquired this
knowledge, a foundation witness or an expert who reviewed the analyst’s report may not have even
met the analyst, and thus would be unable to confirm his statements or conduct. The defendant
would have to resort to extrinsic evidence, which might not be admissible. See id. at 1154-56
(noting that courts generally limit prior bad-acts impeachment to intrinsic evidence but that
commentators have advocated allowing extrinsic evidence for impeachment of hearsay declarants).
281. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1019 (1988)).
282. See Cole, supra note 228, at 817.
283. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Testimony and Wrongful
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009). See also NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 160 (noting that
“several members of the committee have experienced courtroom cases in which, despite the lack of
a statistical foundation, microscopic hair examiners have made probabilistic claims based on their
experience”).
284. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005).
285. See Saks & Koehler, supra note 235, at 206 (noting that many toolmark, latent fingerprint,
bitemark, handwriting, shoeprint and tiremark analysts, among others, make unsupportable
individualization claims); Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, Communicating Opinion
Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1159,
1159-60 (2008) (“With the principal exception of DNA typing, virtually all areas of forensic
identification lack empirically and statistically meaningful measures of the probability that
questioned crime-scene marks and known exemplars share a common origin. Examiners are, at
present, unable to compute random match probabilities; instead, they assume that the pool of
candidates in the population, which can match as well or better than the known suspect, equals
precisely one. So, if they find two markings to be indistinguishably alike, they assume that they
‘share a common origin’ ‘to the exclusion of all others in the world’ and that they have therefore
‘identified the source.’”).

STEVENS_CONLAW_2010-2011.DOC

2011]

6/2/2011 1:50 PM

CRAWFORD’S LAST STAND?

133

claims. 286 Yet overclaiming is pervasive. It “has long been identified as
a problem for microscopic hair comparison,”287 a field in which “the
inability to individuate is recognized” but where analysts continue to
profess having achieved it. 288 It is “institutionalized” among latent
fingerprint analysts, whose professional guidelines mandate that they
make individualization conclusions even though “such claims are
obviously unsustainable.” 289
The prevalence of overclaiming supports affording defendants a
right to cross-examine forensic analysts. When an analyst’s inflated
claims are introduced without his testimony, defense counsel can attempt
to cast doubt on their accuracy by questioning the expert who repeats
them in court (if there is one) or through extrinsic evidence (if it is
admissible). He cannot, however, prompt the analyst to qualify or recant
his inflated claims—or to obstinately maintain them despite revelation of
their shaky foundations, thereby diminishing his appearance of
objectivity. These ends can only be achieved on cross-examination of
the analyst himself.
c. Terminology
Even when a forensic analyst endeavors to report his findings
without exaggeration, his word choice may convey a misleading
impression of their probative value.
In some forensic-science
disciplines, terminology varies among practitioners, so a testifying
expert may interpret a conclusion in an analyst’s report very differently
from how the analyst intended it. Among shoeprint analysts, for
example, a government-sponsored working group recommends the use
of particular terms to indicate particular degrees of certainty in matching
a crime-scene print to a known exemplar, 290 but use of these
recommended terms is not mandatory. 291 Similarly, the American Board
of Forensic Odontologists (ABFO) has “issued guidelines for reporting
bite mark comparisons, including the use of terminology for conclusion
levels, but there is no incentive or requirement that these guidelines be

286. See supra pp. 51-53.
287. Cole, supra note 228, at 819.
288. Saks & Koehler, supra note 235, at 206.
289. Cole, supra note 228, at 820-21. See also NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 141-42
(noting that because population statistics for fingerprint characteristics do not exist, “the friction
ridge community actively discourages its members from testifying in terms of the probability of a
match,” leading examiners to use the language of absolute certainty).
290. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 148.
291. See id. at 149-50.
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used in the criminal justice system.” 292 In other disciplines, such as
paint analysis, no guidelines for report wording presently exist. 293
Ambiguous terminology can lead one expert to misread the
certainty of another’s conclusion, but jurors are even more likely to be
misled. ABFO’s recommended terminology is illustrative. AFBO
standards offer four levels of certainty, from “reasonable scientific
certainty,” which indicates a certain individualization with no reasonable
probability of error, down to “match,” which indicates general similarity,
but no more than for a large percentage of the population. 294 In a survey
of 183 undergraduate students, “jurors” interpreted “reasonable scientific
certainty” as indicating 70.7% certainty, and “match” as indicating 86%
certainty, reversing the terms’ order and assigning a very high level of
certainty to a term intended to convey only general similarity. 295 As the
study authors conclude, “[f]orensic expert witnesses cannot simply adopt
a term, define for themselves what they wish it to mean, and expect
judges and juries to understand what they mean by it.” 296
Terminology “can have a profound effect on how the trier of fact
. . . perceives and evaluates evidence.” 297 Cross-examination—and only
cross-examination—can overcome linguistic ambiguities. The jury or
another expert who testifies in court can easily misinterpret a written
certificate or report that, for example, states a “match” without
elaboration. If permitted to cross-examine the analyst who prepared the
report, however, defense counsel can compel him to clarify his meaning,
possibly giving the jury an entirely different understanding of the
certainty of the analyst’s conclusion.
3. Forensic analysts are not immune from bias.
The dissent insists that forensic analysts will not deviate from their
conclusions on cross-examination because they are disinterested
neutrals, 298 yet the majority suggests two reasons to believe the reverse.
First, many forensic laboratories are administered by or closely affiliated
with law enforcement agencies, and the need to answer particular

292. Id. at 175.
293. See id. at 169.
294. McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 285, at 1161-62.
295. Id. at 1162.
296. Id. at 1163.
297. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 185.
298. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2548 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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questions in particular criminal cases drives much of their work. 299
Second, law enforcement officials who request forensic analyses may
subtly (or not so subtly) influence analysts’ conclusions. 300
a. Law Enforcement Affiliation
With the exception of DNA analysis, most forensic-science
techniques were developed for the specific purpose of solving crimes,
and they “rarely find analogues in academic or commercial settings.”301
“[T]he government not only creates forensic science, but also almost
exclusively executes forensic procedures.” 302 In the majority of forensic
laboratories, the laboratory supervisor reports to the head of a law
enforcement agency. 303 Law enforcement controls the laboratory’s
budget, and administratively, analysts work for the police. 304 This
relationship imposes “[c]ultural pressures” on forensic analysts to
advance the law enforcement mission.305 In essence, analysts and
technicians in public laboratories are service providers, with law
enforcement as their principal or even sole client.306 They may come to
“view themselves not as neutral investigators, but as ‘police in lab
coats,’ part of the police [effort] to convict the suspect.” 307 In some
forensic fields, analysts are police in lab coats: “the vast majority of
firearms and fingerprint examiners . . . are sworn law enforcement
officers.” 308
Forensic analysts’ law enforcement affiliation creates an alarming
potential for bias. If a police officer ultimately signs off on an analyst’s
performance evaluation or determines whether he will receive a pay
raise, the analyst has a strong incentive to keep that officer happy. A
written report cannot disclose the organizational details that give rise to
this incentive, but a canny defense counsel will bring them out on cross299. See id. at 2536 (majority opinion).
300. See id.
301. See Murphy, supra note 229, at 745-46.
302. Id. at 746.
303. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 183.
304. See id. at 183-84.
305. See id. at 184.
306. See Murphy, supra note 229, at 748 (arguing that “[f]orensic scientists often feel the
pressure to produce results that will please their central and even sole client, the government”);
Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 259, at 398 (arguing that forensic
analysts’ service-provider role discourages self-criticism so long as the client is pleased).
307. See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 515.
308. Cooley, CSI Effect, supra note 245, at 481; accord NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 136
(“In some agencies, fingerprint examiners are also required to respond to crime scenes and can be
sworn officers who also perform police officer/detective duties”).
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examination. The analyst will almost certainly profess his operational
independence and insist that he is an unbiased neutral. 309 Cognizant of
the analyst’s relationship to law enforcement, the jury may then judge
whether his claims of neutrality—and by extension, his conclusions—
are credible.
b. Cognitive Bias
Various cognitive biases influence human judgments in everyday
life, and analysts cannot simply leave them at the laboratory door.
Cross-examination may prove ineffectual at exposing many such biases
because their effect is primarily subconscious, yet one form of cognitive
bias can be uncovered in the courtroom. How a question is framed or
the context in which data are presented can affect a person’s answer to
that question or the conclusion he reaches from those data.311 For
example, an eyewitness called to view a line-up may assume that the
perpetrator must be among those presented and, unless cautioned, will
choose the “best” of the available alternatives. 312 In the forensic-science
arena, context bias can arise when an analyst is aware, even
subconsciously, that law enforcement expects or desires a particular
Indeed, police officers often communicate their
outcome. 313
expectations to analysts directly. Requests for forensic testing typically
include a narrative that explains the requester’s theory of events and
details inculpatory information about the suspect, thereby framing the
analyst’s work as an effort to confirm the theory. 314 Such information
310

309. See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 515 (quoting high-ranking officials in public
forensic laboratories as insisting that they hold no pro-prosecution bias).
310. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 122. These influences include the desire to please
others; the tendency to become more confident in a preliminary conclusion over time, and to thus
ignore new and contradictory information; the tendency to rely too heavily on a single piece of
information, often among the first encountered, when making decisions; the tendency to ignore
base-rate statistics in assessing the probative value of information; and the tendency to see patterns
that do not exist. See id. at 122-24.
311. Id. at 122.
312. Id. at 122-23.
313. See Cooley, CSI Effect, supra note 245, at 487. Forensic analysts’ practices may
compound this problem. If an analyst compares evidence found at a crime-scene only to an
exemplar from a suspect and not to a pool of samples, this predisposes the analyst to identify
similarities between the two. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 123. Forensic odontologists, in
particular, typically compare a bite mark only to “dental casts of an individual or individuals of
interest” and rarely make comparisons to “models from other individuals.” Id. at 174.
314. See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 516-17; Cooley, CSI Effect, supra note 245, at
488. In one Texas case, for example, police requesting DNA tests in a homicide investigation
provided a detailed memorandum naming the child victim and caregiver-suspect, and explaining the
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can alter an analyst’s conclusions. In a series of studies, researchers
Dror and Charlton found that when contextual information was
introduced, experienced fingerprint examiners reached different
conclusions on reexamination of fingerprint pairs they had previously
analyzed. 315
Cross-examination cannot reveal, definitively, whether context bias
affected a forensic analyst’s judgment, but counsel can at least inquire
about whether police officers provided contextual information to the
analyst. Jurors may learn that the analyst considered only the defendant
as a possible source of biological material found at the crime scene; that
officers provided the analyst with a detailed theory of the case before the
analyst concluded that evidence inculpated the defendant; or that the
analyst performed his work in a neutral vacuum. Whatever information
is unearthed about the context in which the analyst reached his
conclusions, it will better enable the jury to evaluate the reliability of
those conclusions.
4. Forensic analysts will recall information relevant to the
particular test or defendant.
The dissent asserts that cross-examination of forensic analysts will
prove fruitless because the analyst “will not remember [having
conducted] a particular test or the link it had to the defendant.”316 As
argued
above,
cross-examination
concerning
an
analyst’s
methodology—a subject on which his memory is unlikely to fail—will
aid the jury in evaluating the reliability of an individual test result.
Moreover, as with any expert witness, “an analyst’s lack of proper
training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed in crossexamination.” 317 An analyst will not suffer from lack of memory as to
his education, training, and performance on proficiency tests—all of

investigating officer’s theory of how the child’s death had occurred. See Cuadros-Fernandez v.
State, 316 S.W.3d 645, 655 (Tex. App. 2009).
315. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 123 (describing study in which information such as
“suspect confessed to the crime” was provided along with instructions accompanying prints, and in
which examiners reached different conclusions in 6 of 24 examinations); Saks & Koehler, supra
note 235, at 201 (describing two studies, one in which 4 of 5 experts who had previously matched
prints reached different conclusions after learning the prints came from different people, and one in
which contextual information induced 4 of 6 examiners to reach different conclusions about at least
1 of 8 pairs of prints they had previously matched).
316. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2548 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
317. Id. at 2537 (majority opinion).
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which will inform a rational assessment of his conclusions in a particular
case.
a. Education
Most forensic laboratories require that new hires in most disciplines
possess at least a bachelor’s degree, if not a higher degree, though an
associate degree may be acceptable for firearms, document, and
fingerprint analysts. 318 Still, 96% of forensic analysts hold only
bachelor’s or associate degrees, 319 and “the vast majority of firearms and
fingerprint examiners do not . . . possess an undergraduate degree of any
kind.” 320
Most laboratories also require that applicants hold degrees in
forensic science or a natural science, and “[o]ver the years, most crime
laboratory hires have been and continue to be graduates with degrees in
chemistry or biology.” 321 “It is the exception and not the norm,”
however, “when a forensic practitioner holds a graduate degree—
especially a doctorate degree—in a natural or physical science.” 322 A
degree in forensic science suffices for employment at most
laboratories, 323 yet no nationwide standards exist for forensic-science
programs. 324 Their curricula “range from rigorous scientific coursework
. . . to little more than criminal justice degrees with an internship.” 325
Indeed, “‘it is possible to earn a degree called ‘Masters in Forensic
Science’ without ever having set foot in a laboratory or even having
taken a core curriculum of hard science classes.’” 326 Similarly, although
conclusions in most forensic disciplines rest on a statistical basis, few
forensic-science curricula include even a single statistics course. 327
When a forensic analyst’s “scientific” conclusion is introduced into
evidence, the extent of that analyst’s education in science (and statistics)
318. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 220-21.
319. DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 522. See also Murphy, supra note 229, at 746
(noting that “technicians who hold no more than an undergraduate degree staff many police crime
laboratories”).
320. Cooley, CSI Effect, supra note 245, at 481.
321. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 221. Explosives and paint analysts, in particular,
typically have extensive science backgrounds. Id. at 168, 170.
322. Cooley, CSI Effect, supra note 245, at 482.
323. NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 223.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Cooley, CSI Effect, supra note 245, at 482 (quoting KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDIN,
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINALISTICS: THE PROFESSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 303-04
(2001)).
327. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community, supra note 259, at 428.
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is plainly relevant to the conclusion’s reliability. The odds are slim that
a written certificate or report will describe the author’s education, and an
expert witness who bases his opinion on the report is unlikely to know
this information. Only cross-examination of the analyst can provide
these valuable details to the jury.
b. Training
Many laboratory accreditation and individual certification programs
require that analysts receive discipline-specific training and pass a
competency test before working independently, and that they satisfy
continuing education requirements.328 But “[t]here is no uniformity in
the certification of forensic practitioners . . . . Indeed, most jurisdictions
do not require forensic practitioners to be certified, and most forensic
disciplines have no mandatory certification programs.” 329 Even where
certification is required, minimum requirements may not include “an
understanding of the scientific basis of the examinations . . . [or] the use
of a scientific method.” 330 Training of latent fingerprint examiners, for
example, varies widely, and “not all agencies require [them] to achieve
and maintain certification.” 331
Similarly, “accreditation of crime laboratories is not required in
most jurisdictions.” 332 A 2005 survey of publicly-funded crime
laboratories found that 81% had achieved accreditation, with stateoperated laboratories (91%) scoring far higher than their county (67%)
or municipal (62%) counterparts. 333 Still, many forensic entities—in
particular, latent fingerprint examination units—operate independently
from crime laboratories, and these units do not, and are not required to,
participate in accreditation programs. 334
As with education, a forensic analyst’s training and certification
status, as well as the accreditation status of the laboratory or other
facility for which he works, are topics relevant to the credibility of his
conclusions and on which failure of memory is unlikely. And as with

328. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 231.
329. Id. at 6.
330. Id. at 147-48 (discussing shoeprint and tiremark analysis).
331. Id. at 137.
332. Id. at 6.
333. Id. at 199-200. But cf. DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 518 (reporting that as of
February 2007, only 330 of more than 1000 crime laboratories throughout the United States had
achieved accreditation).
334. See NRC REPORT, supra note 161, at 200.
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education, only cross-examination of the analyst himself will provide
comprehensive information on these subjects to the jury.
c. Proficiency
As of 2002, 274 of 351 publicly-funded forensic laboratories
engaged in proficiency testing, but almost all used “declared” tests, in
which the analyst knows he is being tested. 335 Externally-designed,
closed tests using “realistic case samples” (which allow for performance
comparisons across laboratories, and in which the analyst does not know
he is being evaluated) “are virtually nonexistent,” 336 and laboratories
seldom publish their results. 337
Whether an analyst has undergone recent proficiency tests—and if
so, how they were designed, and how he performed on them—would
inform a rational factfinder’s reliability assessment of the analyst’s
conclusions. This information is particularly crucial in the many
disciplines that involve subjectivity or in which analysts rely principally
on their experience. If an analyst concludes that a crime scene
fingerprint and the defendant’s print so resemble one another that they
could not have originated from different sources, this conclusion’s
reliability depends heavily on that analyst’s judgment. And the quality
of that judgment can be evaluated only based on how often he’s right. In
most real-world scenarios, one cannot know with certainty whether a
“match” conclusion was correct. So, the analyst’s proficiency must be
judged, if at all, by how he performs when analyzing exemplars known
(to a test administrator, not the analyst) to originate from the same
source or from different sources. As with education and training,
affording the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the analyst is
the surest way to get this information before the jury.
*
*
*
*
*
In sum, cross-examination of forensic analysts will not be pointless.
On the contrary, it can make invaluable contributions to jurors’ ability to
rationally evaluate forensic evidence.
First, cross-examination can expose forensic analyses as subjective
and/or based on unvalidated methodologies with unknown accuracy
rates and without standardized protocols. Objectivity, validity, accuracy,
and regularity are all fundamental characteristics of science—and

335. Id. at 207-08.
336. Saks & Kohler, supra note 235, at 202.
337. Murphy, supra note 229, at 747.
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science has a talismanic effect on juries. Expert evidence can be
particularly powerful. 338 When labeled as “science,” it can assume an
aura of “mystic infallibility.” 339 Popular culture, particularly television
programs that glorify forensic science and present it as an infallible
crime-solving tool, reinforces jurors’ instinctive trust in “science.” 340
Accordingly, jurors tend to overestimate the probative value of forensic
evidence, “putting greater weight on such evidence than its statistical
value warrants.” 341
In reality, however, most forensic-science
disciplines are not very scientific. Exposure of their flaws through
cross-examination will enable the jury to assess forensic evidence more
comprehensively, and perhaps more importantly, it may dispel the
illusion that such evidence is, in fact, science.
Second, cross-examination may prompt a forensic analyst to retract,
qualify, or modify his conclusions. Scholars and the mainstream media
have extensively documented instances of fraud in the forensic sciences,
and like any other dishonest witness, a forensic analyst may recant when
forced to defend his conclusions in the “crucible of cross-examination.”
Moreover, while fraud remains a relative rarity, exaggerated and
ambiguous conclusions are all too common. When an analyst succumbs
to overclaiming, cross-examination can prompt him to qualify his
conclusions, revealing the uncertainty of his individualization claim or
that a stated population statistic is merely an educated guess. And when
an analyst frames his conclusion in ambiguous terms, cross-examination
can compel him to clarify his meaning for the jury. For example, this
338. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993); United States v.
Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004).
339. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Saby Ghoshray,
Untangling the CSI Effect In Criminal Jurisprudence: Circumstantial Evidence, Reasonable Doubt,
and Jury Manipulation, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 533, 547-53 (2007) (theorizing that reliance on
supposedly objective, scientific evidence reduces jurors’ cognitive stress and enables them to reach
verdicts more easily).
340. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth
and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050 (2006) (examining the “CSI Effect,” a
phenomenon by which the television program CSI is said to influence jury decision-making);
Michael Mann, The “CSI Effect”: Better Jurors Through Television and Science?, 24 BUFF. PUB.
INT. L.J. 211 (2006) (also examining the “CSI Effect,” and discussing other media and cultural
influences that condition jurors to implicitly trust in science).
341. Tyler, supra note 340, at 1063; accord DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 228, at 527-28;
Leading Cases, supra note 227, at 208-09. But cf. Wendy Brickell, Is It the CSI Effect, or Do We
Just Distrust Juries?, 23 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 11, 16-17 (2008) (arguing that multiple empirical
studies have debunked the notion that jurors instinctively defer to expert witnesses); Dale A. Nance
& Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of
Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small Random-Match Probability, 34 J.
LEGAL STUD. 395, 400-01, 418-19 (2005) (reporting results of empirical study and concluding that
participants had undervalued DNA match statistics relative to Bayesian norms).
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may reveal that by “match,” the analyst intended to imply only some
similarity, not an individualization, or that by “probable,” he meant only
more likely than not. Thus, cross-examination can leave the jury with a
deeper, and perhaps very different, understanding of the analyst’s
conclusions.
Third, although “far removed” from the defendant and the crime, 342
a forensic analyst is no more immune from bias than any other witness.
His law enforcement affiliation may give him an indirect interest in the
outcome of his analysis, and contextual information may have skewed
his conclusions. Exposing the facts giving rise to bias, actual or
apparent, is one fundamental purpose of cross-examination, and it can
fulfill this purpose just as effectively with forensic analysts as with
percipient witnesses.
Finally, forensic analysts should have no trouble recalling the
details of their education, training, and performance on proficiency tests,
all of which are relevant to each individual case in which they render
conclusions. Whether the analyst holds a Ph.D in chemistry or an
associate’s degree in criminal justice may profoundly affect the jury’s
trust in his expertise. Likewise, whether the analyst holds a professional
certification, whether he works at an accredited facility, and whether he
regularly undergoes and performs well on proficiency tests will all
contribute to how a rational factfinder weighs that analyst’s conclusions.
Melendez-Diaz has made possible cross-examination and
consequent education of the jury on all of these subjects. Thus,
Melendez-Diaz promises to greatly enhance the reliability of verdicts
based on forensic evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts foreshadows the end of an
ambitious originalist experiment within constitutional criminal
procedure. Constitutional law typically advances by increments.
Against the backdrop of 200 years of jurisprudence, both stare decisis
and deference to the political branches ensure that only on exceedingly
rare occasions will the Court wipe the slate clean and start anew in
interpreting a constitutional provision. Yet in Crawford, the Court did
just that, announcing a simple and elegant rule that would, in theory,
both constrain judicial discretion and honor the Framers’ intent.

342. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2548 (2009) (Kennedy J.,
dissenting).
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In Melendez-Diaz, that theoretically appealing rule collided with
reality. The Court carried Crawford to its logical conclusion, albeit one
that even some of its initial supporters had evidently failed to foresee.
That conclusion’s real-world ramifications so alarmed four members of
the Court that they implicitly repudiated Crawford, leaving it with the
unqualified support of only four—now, two—Justices. Regardless of
where Justices Sotomayor and Kagan stand on the issue, no five
members of the Court now agree on which hearsay statements implicate
the Confrontation Clause. Melendez-Diaz thus marks the end of
Crawford’s advance.
Although the basic Crawford rule now lacks majority support, the
Court has not overruled it. Thus, the “testimonial statements” doctrine
lives on, but Crawford’s simple and elegant rule seems destined to grow
ever more complicated and unwieldy. Suppose that the two newest
Justices share their predecessors’ views, and that those who silently
joined the Melendez-Diaz majority and dissent wholeheartedly agree
with the ideas advanced in those opinions. If so, then in a future case,
the Court would find a hearsay statement to implicate the Confrontation
Clause only if it is testimonial under Crawford and Davis, and only if
either the declarant is a conventional witness, or the statement bears
sufficient indicia of formality. Although the Court has defined none of
these concepts—testimonial statements, indicia of formality, and
conventional witnesses—with any precision, this “testimonial-plus” rule
would likely prove easier for lower courts to apply than the alternative.
That is, if the three-way split evinced by Melendez-Diaz does not
adequately capture the diversity of opinion on the Court as to which
hearsay statements trigger the confrontation right, then the future likely
holds only a muddle of fact-bound decisions. The Crawford Court
sought to impose certainty and predictability on an area of constitutional
law previously characterized by boundless judicial discretion.
Ironically, the future direction of the Court’s jurisprudence in that area is
now anything but certain.
Melendez-Diaz may thus herald Crawford’s demise, but at the same
time, it represents Crawford’s zenith. Crawford itself profoundly
changed criminal practice. Melendez-Diaz will almost certainly do the
same. Before, the vast majority of jurisdictions authorized prosecutors
to introduce forensic analyses through sworn certificates. Now, in most
cases, if the defendant objects (as he very likely will), prosecutors must
present live testimony or else forego use of highly persuasive forensic
evidence.
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In the short run, implementing this rule will impose tremendous
costs on the criminal justice system. Thanks to several inherent
limitations on the decision’s scope, Melendez-Diaz will not affect all
forensic evidence. Yet because prosecutors rely on such evidence in so
very many cases, demand for forensic analysts’ live testimony will still
increase dramatically.
Early empirical evidence supports this
conclusion. As one recent essay reports, subpoenas to forensic analysts
in Virginia criminal trials jumped from a monthly average of 528 in the
nine months before Melendez-Diaz to 1885 in July, the month directly
after the decision issued; 1737 in August; 1631 in September; and 1441
in October. 343 These numbers reflect the experience of only one state
over a very brief period, but they are staggering. Public crime
laboratories already face backlogs. Melendez-Diaz will magnify this
problem as analysts struggle to balance their laboratory duties with trial
schedules. Additionally, in most jurisdictions budgetary constraints will
preclude hiring additional staff to cope with these new demands.
Over time, however, government and governmental actors will
adapt, as they have to the Court’s past constitutional criminal procedure
decisions. The downward trend in defendants’ subpoenas to Virginia
forensic analysts illustrates this point. The aforementioned essay’s
authors posit that prosecutors’ gradual acceptance of—and submission
to—defendants’ increased leverage in plea negotiations may account for
the decline in subpoenas from their July peak. 344 Just as prosecutors will
adapt to the new regime, so, too, will public crime laboratories. They
will devise and adopt new procedures and organizational structures to
facilitate analysts’ availability and readiness for in-court testimony, and
if necessary, they will shift or obtain funds to hire additional personnel.
The criminal justice system will eventually reach a new equilibrium, at
which more forensic analysts take the stand and the average plea
agreement is a bit more favorable to the defendant. Melendez-Diaz will
impose costs, but it does not spell the end of either forensic evidence or
criminal prosecutions.
Moreover, the decision’s costs are not without corresponding
benefits. Forensic evidence is a ubiquitous feature of criminal trials. As
with any other type of evidence, we expect jurors to rationally assess its
probative value before applying it to their verdict. Yet, we have long
asked them to make these assessments without any foundation. As a
general matter, jurors tend to overestimate the probative value of

343. Murphy & Brown, supra note 124, at 98.
344. See id.
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forensic evidence, treating it as inherently credible, objective “science.”
Yet most forensic sciences involve very little science and only very
rarely are their practitioners truly scientists. Instead, inadequatelyeducated technicians of unknown competence populate many forensic
disciplines, applying unvalidated methodologies with unknown error
rates and irregular procedures to reach subjective conclusions. Further,
while many forensic analysts may not be scientists, they are all human,
and like all others, they may lie, exaggerate, communicate their ideas
unclearly, or harbor bias. And yet, before Melendez-Diaz, many
jurisdictions authorized prosecutors to introduce analysts’ bare
conclusions through sworn certificates without any accompanying live
testimony. One could hardly expect jurors to rationally evaluate forensic
evidence in such an information vacuum.
Melendez-Diaz promises to change this situation for the better.
Cross-examination of forensic analysts can yield a wealth of valuable
information for the jury, enabling them to do more than simply take
forensic conclusions at face value. Jurors may have an opportunity to do
what their job requires: to examine the various circumstances
surrounding a piece of evidence, weigh those circumstances, and
conclude whether and how much to rely on the evidence in deciding the
ultimate question of guilt or innocence. Enhancing the reliability of the
evidence on which a verdict rests will enhance the reliability of the
verdict itself. Cross-examination of forensic analysts will serve the
truth-seeking function of criminal trials and fundamental fairness.
Of course, cross-examination’s value in a particular trial depends
on defense counsel’s effectiveness. Melendez-Diaz guarantees only that
a defendant may demand live testimony from a forensic analyst. He
need not do so, and if he does, defense counsel may fail to elicit relevant
information about the analyst’s methods and qualifications. Many
crime-lab horror stories have emerged through independent
investigations, not when forensic analysts admitted to fraud or
incompetence under withering cross-examination. 345 Moreover, giving
jurors the requisite information to thoroughly and rationally evaluate the
reliability of forensic evidence does not ensure that they will use it. 346
345. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Rodriguez v. City of Houston,
and Remedial Rationing, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 82, 87 (2009) (citing several examples).
346. At least with respect to DNA, some empirical research suggests that information elicited
on cross-examination of forensic analysts has little to no effect on jurors’ decisions. See Nance &
Morris, supra note 341, at 433-35 (2005) (finding that informing jurors of a DNA laboratory’s error
rate through cross-examination of a DNA analyst had no statistically significant effect on jurors’
willingness to convict, and theorizing that jurors rationally discount DNA match probabilities based
on an assumed risk of lab error). Cf. Shari Seidman Diamond et. al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at
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Nevertheless, if reliable verdicts based on reliable evidence are the goal
of criminal trials, then Melendez-Diaz is a welcome step in the right
direction.

Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1996) (finding that strong cross-examination of
prosecution psychiatrist had an immediate, positive effect on jurors’ perceptions of defense counsel
but no effect on their ultimate verdict or verdict confidence measures); Margaret Bull Kovera et. al.,
Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Effects of Expert Evidence Type and CrossExamination, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 653 (1994) (finding that cross-examination of prosecution
expert on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome had no significant effect on jurors’
reliability assessments).

